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SPOUSAL RIGHTS IN OUR MULTIPLE-MARRIAGE
SOCIETY: THE REVISED UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE*
Lawrence W. Waggoner"
Editors' Synopsis: The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Probate Code has adopted omnibus revisions to Article II of the
Uniform Probate Code, including significant amendments affecting
spousal rights. The author examines the policies underlying the
spousal rights amendments and explains the impact of the four
most significant revisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE REVISION PROJECT
A. Section 2-804: The Revocation-Upon-Divorce
Provision
1. Conventional Statutes
This article is an updated and expanded version of two lectures given by the
author: the Mortimer H. Hess Memorial Lecture, delivered at the House of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York on December 4, 1989, see Lawrence
W. Waggoner, Spousal Probate Rights in a Multiple-Mamiage Society, in 45 REC. ASS'N
B. CITY N.Y. 339 (1990); and the Hugh J. Tamisiea and Frank Tamisiea Lecture,
delivered at the University of Iowa College of Law on October 6, 1989, see
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Maniage Society and Spousal Rights Under the
Revised Uniform Probate Code, in 76 IOWA L REV. 223 (1990). This article also
draws upon LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS (1991), and the
author's Joseph Trachtman Lecture, delivered at the 1992 annual meeting of the
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel on March 8, 1992, see Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Marital Propeny Rights in Transition, in 17 PROB. LAW. (forthcoming
Summer 1992). Copyright 0 1992 by Lawrence W. Waggoner.
Director of Research and Chief Reporter, Joint Editorial Board for the
Uniform Probate Code; Reporter, Drafting Committee to Revise Article II of the
Uniform Probate Code. The author is also the Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law,
University of Michigan Law School. I wish to thank Eleanor B. Alter, Mary Ann
Glendon, John H. Langbein, Malcolm A. Moore, and Patricia J. Roberts for their
helpful comments regarding an earlier draft of this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The transformation of the American family constitutes one of
the great phenomenons of the past two decades.1 The traditional
Leave It to Beaver family no longer prevails in American society. To
be sure, families consisting of the wage-earning husband, the
homemaking and child-rearing wife, and their two joint children still
exist. But divorce rates are astonishingly high2 and remarriage
abounds.3 In fact, there is an increasing prevalence in the popula-
1 Articles frequently appear in the popular press discussing various aspects of
this phenomenon. See, e.g., Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, Step By Step,
NEWSWEEK, Winter/Spring 1990, at 24 (composing part of the special edition, The
21st Century Family).
2 A demographic study recently found:
' Although annual rates of divorce have fluctuated around the trend
line, the underlying rate of increase in the level of lifetime divorce has
been virtually constant for more than 100 years, generating the
accelerating curve from 7% for marriages in 1860 to the current
expectation of well over one-half. It is too soon to conclude that the
plateau in the divorce rate of the last decade represents the end of this
trend-we must remember that there was a similar 15-year plateau
before the takeoff of the late 1960s.
In any event, the current level of marital disruption is very high.
[A 1989 study] recently estimated that almost two-thirds of recent first
marriages would be likely to disrupt if current levels persist. Further
work leads us to suspect that 60% may be closer to the mark. The
exact level of marital disruption is much less important, however, than
the social fact that the majority of recent first marriages will not last a
lifetime.
Larry Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic
and Institutional Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 485 (1990) (footnote omitted); see
also Norval D. Glenn, What Does Family Mean?, Am. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 1992, at
30, 30 ("If current divorce rates continue, about two out of the three marriages that
begin this year will not survive as long as both spouses live.").
3 Government data indicate:
Most Americans marry, and if the marriage ends in divorce, more
than three-fourths marry again....
During the 1970-83 period the annual totals of remarriages of
previously divorced men and women increased by 82 percent. The
estimated national number of previously divorced brides increased from
WINTER 1992
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tion of marriages that are more likely to end in divorce than
others-marriages in which one or both partners were divorced
before 4 and marriages of couples who cohabited prior to marriage.'
404,000 in 1970 to 736,000 in 1983. The estimated number of previous-
ly divorced grooms increased from 423,000 in 1970 to 773,000 in 1983.
In the 14-year period, 8.2 million previously divorced women and 8.7
million previously divorced men remarried.... Currently about 1 out
of 3 American brides and grooms have been married before, up from
1 out of 4 in 1970.
BARBARA F. WILSON, U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 89-
1923, REMARRIAGES AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES-UNITED STATES 1-2 (1989)
[hereinafter REMARRIAGES AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES].
4 See i. at 16 ("Generally, the more times a divorcing person has been married,
the briefer the duration of the marriage.... It may be that some selection factor
is at work and that people who divorce repeatedly are likely to regard divorce as an
acceptable solution to an unpleasant marriage and resort to it with increasing
promptness."); James McCarthy, A Comparison of the Probability of the Dissolution
of First and Second Marriages, 15 DEMOGRAPHY 345 (1978).
5 See James A. Sweet & Larry Bumpass, Disruption of Marital and Cohabitation
Relationships:A Social-Demographic Perspective, 23-25 (Nat'l Survey of Families and
Households Working Paper No. 32, 1990). The authors state:
There are two separate ways to think about the relationship of
increased cohabitation to marital disruption--on the aggregate level and
on the individual level.
At the aggregate level, rising levels of cohabitation may have the
effect of reducing the rate of marital disruption. If cohabitation is seen
by the participants as a "trial marriage" or if it is something done by
people who would like to marry but whose lives are not settled enough
to feel that they should get married, then it may be that cohabitation
will tend to select out "unsuitable" unions prior to marriage-in effect,
resulting in many couples "divorcing" before they get married. If this is
true, the current rate of marital disruption may be lower than it would
have been in the absence of the increase in cohabitation. Thus, the
slowing of the increase in the divorce rate that has been observed in
the early 1980s may be due to this, rather than to an increase in
"familism" or an increased commitment to marriage.
On the individual level, what is the effect of having cohabited on
subsequent marital stability? Again, one might think that couples who
are unsuitable for each other may find that out while cohabiting and
never get married. This might suggest that, other things equal, couples
who cohabit before they get married would have a lower rate of marital
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In addition, single parent families and families with two working
adults are commonplace. Lesbian, gay, and unmarried heterosexual
couples, sometimes with children, constitute unmistakable parts of
the American family scene. Inevitably, this transformation of the
family will increasingly exert new tensions on traditional wealth-
succession laws and on overlapping fields such as family, social
security, and pension law. 6
disruption than those who did not. The data suggest that this is not the
case. Persons who cohabited prior to first marriage have a much higher
rate of marital disruption than those who did not. If they lived only
with their spouse, the rate is 49 percent higher than for those who did
not cohabit; if they lived with someone other than their first spouse,
their rate is 84 percent higher.
•.. There are two alternative explanations for this result. First,
there may be something about living together prior to marriage that
affects the survival chances of the marriage. Perhaps expectations
about the relationship or behavior patterns develop during the period
the couple is cohabiting that are not conducive to the long-term survival
of the relationship....
The second possibility is that couples who choose to cohabit
before getting married are selected on (unmeasured) characteristics that
are not conducive to the long-term survival of marriage. That is to say,
these couples would have a higher risk of marital instability, even in the
absence of cohabitation. They may have a value system that places a
relatively lower priority on relationship stability, or personality
characteristics that are not conducive to cultivating and maintaining
strong, enduring relationships.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Kenneth Woodward, Young Beyond Their Years,
NEWSWEEK, Winter/Spring 1990, at 54, 57 ("'[Cohabitation is] a relationship that
attracts, those, mainly men, who are looking for an easy out ... and it is uncertain
what, if anything, it contributes to marriage." (quoting sociologist Glen Elder of the
University of North Carolina)).
6 The trend toward multiple marriages and reconstituted families seems to be
unremitting. Like any trend, however, it might moderate or even reverse itself as
future generations adopt different attitudes toward family. Regardless of whether
the trend moderates or reverses itself, multiple marriages will continue to exist-only
the incidence might decrease. Furthermore, the high-incidence multiple-marriage
and reconstituted-family segment of the current population spans the young adult
generation and reaches at least into the younger portions of the mid-life generation.
As this large segment moves through the life cycle to old age and eventually death,
many married couples will end life having children from prior marriages or
partnerships on one or both sides.
WINTER 1992
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II. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE REVISION PROJECT
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is over twenty years old and
was developed prior to the multiple-marriage society. Article II of
the UPC, which covers the substantive law of intestacy, wills, and
certain aspects of nonprobate transfers, has now undergone a
systematic round of review.7 A main objective of the project was to
develop sensible rules adaptable to the ever-changing climate of
marital behavior. The Article II revisions have now been completed,
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL), and promulgated as an official revision of the
UPC.8 These revisions have also been promulgated as a freestand-
ing Uniform Act on Intestacy, Wills, and Donative Transfers that can
7 The review was conducted by the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Probate Code and the Drafting Committee to Revise Article II of the Uniform
Probate Code. The Joint Editorial Board consists of three representatives each from
the Uniform Laws Conference (Clark A. Gravel of Vermont; Professor John H.
Langbein of Yale Law School; and Dean Robert A. Stein of the University of
Minnesota School of Law); the American Bar Association (Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., of
Wisconsin; Professor and former Dean Edward C. Halbach, Jr., of the University of
California at Berkeley School of Law; and Malcolm A. Moore of Washington); and
the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (J. Pennington Straus of
Pennsylvania, who serves as Chairman; Charles A. Collier, Jr., of California; and
Raymond H. Young of Massachusetts; with Harrison F. Durand of New Jersey and
Harley J. Spitler of California as Emeritus Representatives). The Law School
Liaison to the Board is Professor and former Dean Eugene F. Scoles of the
University of Oregon School of Law and the Probate Judges Liaison is James R.
Wade of Colorado. Professor Richard V. Wellman serves as the Board's Executive
Director.
The Drafting Committee to Revise Article II of the Uniform Probate Code
was chaired by Richard V. Wellman. The members were the three Uniform Laws
Conference members of the Joint Editorial Board (Gravel, Langbein, and Stein) and
Commissioners Florence Nelson Crisp of North Carolina, Richard E. Ford of West
Virginia, and Oglesby H. Young of Oregon. The Advisers to the Drafting
Committee were Professor Martin D. Begleiter of Drake University School of Law,
who represented the American Bar Association, and Professor Gail McNight
Beckman of Georgia State University, who represented the National Association of
Women Lawyers.
8 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -1010, 8 U.LA. 66-201 (Supp. 1992).
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be adopted without the procedural and other provisions of the full
UPC.
The Article II revisions are far-reaching. To one degree or
another, nearly every section has been revised. An in-depth analysis
of all these revisions is beyond the scope of this article. This article
will examine the following four parts in detail: (1) the spouse's
intestate share (section 2-102), (2) the spouse's elective (forced)
share (sections 2-201 to 2-207), (3) the spouse's rights against a
premarital will (section 2-301), and (4) revocation of benefits to the
former spouse in the case of divorce (section 2-804). 9 Of the new
provisions, these four have the greatest impact on the multiple-
marriage society. Throughout this article, I will illustrate the effect
of these provisions upon the multiple-marriage society from the
vantagepoint of Ben and Elaine, a fictional couple whose marriage
plays out in various ways.
A. Section 2-804: The Revocation-Upon-Divorce Provision
For many years, Ben and Elaine had a happy and prosperous
marriage. They purchased a house in joint tenancy and consulted an
estate planning attorney who drafted reciprocal wills and a revocable
inter-vivos trust for them. Ben's employer provided a retirement
plan, and Ben personally acquired a substantial amount of life
insurance. All of these documents-the will, the revocable trust, the
retirement plan, and the life-insurance policy---designated Elaine as
the primary beneficiary at Ben's death. Ben, an only child whose
parents had died, attempted to foster good relations with Elaine's
parents by naming them as the alternate beneficiaries.
As time elapsed, Ben and Elaine grew apart. Ben devoted his
time to his work and neglected Elaine. Elaine devoted her time to
Carl, a former sweetheart whom she nearly married before she met
Ben. Eventually Ben and Elaine's difficulties led to divorce. Shortly
after the divorce, Elaine married Carl. And, shortly after Elaine's
9 These statutory provisions are appended at the end of this article. See infru
Appendix.
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marriage to Carl, Ben died. Because Ben never amended any of the
documents constituting his estate plan, the applicability of the
revocation-upon-divorce provision commonly found in probate codes
critically impacts the distribution of Ben's assets.
1. Conventional Statutes
Conventional non-UPC provisions10 and the pre-1990 UPC
provision11 revoke the disposition in Ben's will to Elaine, but do not
extend that treatment to the house held in joint tenancy or to Ben's
revocable trust, retirement plan, or life-insurance policy. For
purposes of Ben's will, these provisions effectively treat Elaine as if
she predeceased Ben, which triggers the will's alternative disposition
in favor of Elaine's parents.
Due no doubt to the increased usage of will substitutes, such as
revocable trusts, the courts have increasingly been asked to utilize
statutory construction techniques to extend the non-UPC and pre-
1990 UPC provisions to various types of revocable disposi-
tions-dispositions that are wills in function and substance, but not in
form. 12 As one might expect, the case results have varied. Particu-
10 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 9 (West 1981); N.Y. EsT.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 5-1.4 (McKinney 1981).
11 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508, 8 U.L.A. 122 (1983) (amended 1990).
12 Apart from statute, divorce decrees and separation agreements are usually
held not to revoke life-insurance or similar beneficiary designations of a former
spouse unless they say so specifically. See Rountree v. Frazee, 209 So. 2d 424, 426
(Ala. 1968) ("One may take out a life insurance policy on his own life and... name
anyone as a beneficiary regardless of whether [the beneficiary] has an insurable
interest.... [D]ivorce per se [does] not affect or defeat any of [the former spouse's]
rights as the designated beneficiary."); American Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Binford,
511 So. 2d 1250, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1987) ("[Ihe description in the policy of Ms.
Watson as wife is merely the showing of a relationship in existence at the time of the
execution of the contract. The termination of the relationship has no automatic
effect on the provisions of the insurance policy."); Gerhard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258
A.2d 724, 729 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969) ("[A] separation agreement ... which
contain[s] a general release of all claims to each other's estate [does] not divest the
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larly noteworthy is the 1985 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Clymer v. Mayo.13 The Clymer court, in applying
a Massachusetts statute14 virtually identical to the pre-1990 version
of UPC section 2-508, held the statute applicable to a revocable
inter-vivos trust. But the court was also careful to restrict its "holding
to the particular facts of [that] case-specifically the existence of a
revocable pour-over trust funded entirely at the time of the dece-
dent's death."'5 The testator's will devised the residue of her estate
[former] wife of her interest, as named beneficiary, since her claim under the policy
was neither against him nor his estate, but was against the insurance company.");
Romero v. Melendez, 498 P.2d 305, 308 (N.M. 1972) ("The weight of competent
authority seems to support the proposition that where the divorce decree makes a
definite disposition of the insurance policies, the [former] wife's interest as a
beneficiary can be defeated by such disposition.... [Cases holding conversely to
[sic] do so on the basis of the absence of a clear divorce decree."); Cannon v.
Hamilton, 189 N.E.2d 152, 154-55 (Ohio 1963) ("[Wlhere the terms of a separation
agreement carried into a divorce decree plainly disclose an intent to remove the
[former spouse] from all rights to the proceeds [of a life insurance policy], such
agreement may... prevent the [former spouse] from claiming the proceeds..., but
the separation agreement herein did not contain language sufficiently strong or
definite to accomplish that result, especially when considered in relation to [the
insured's failure] to change the beneficiary in accordance with the terms of the
policy."); see also Bersch v. VanKleeck, 334 N.W.2d 114 (Wis. 1983). But cf. Stiles v.
Stiles, 487 N.E.2d 874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that former spouse was not an
eligible beneficiary although designated as beneficiary prior to divorce); Harris v.
Harris, 804 P.2d 1277 (Wash. Ct. App.) (holding that postdivorce community
property agreement between decedent and new spouse revoked predivorce
designation of former spouse as beneficiary of decedent's retirement plan), review
denied, 116 P.2d 103 (Wash. 1991).
13 473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1985).
14 The current version is MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 9 (West 1990).
15 Clymer, 473 N.E.2d at 1093. The court's statement that the receptacle trust,
into which the decedent's residuary estate poured, was to be "funded entirely at the
time of the decedent's death" was a misdescription. The text of the court's opinion
indicates that the receptacle trust was a life insurance trust. By designating the
trustee as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy, the testator-insured conferred
on the trustee a contract right to collect the life insurance proceeds on the testator-
insured's death. Under well-established trust law, this contract right constituted the
trust res. See Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 191 N.E. 250 (I1. 1934); Bose v.
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to the trustee of an unfunded life-insurance trust executed on the
same day as her will. The life insurance was employer-paid. When
connected to a pour-over devise, this type of trust is the easiest to
label the same as a "will," 16 and thus to say the statute applies.
Some other courts have reached similar conclusions, 17 but the
majority have been unwilling to extend similar statutory provisions to
will substitutes unconnected to a pour-over devise, even though the
particular will substitute served as the functional equivalent of a
,,will.,18
The problem with these state statutes is not that the courts have
construed them too narrowly, but that the statutes themselves have
not expressly covered all of the arrangements that are functionally
equivalent to wills.
Meury, 163 A. 276 (NJ. Ch. 1932); Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 271 P.2d 653
(Or. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 cmt. f, § 82 cmt. b, § 84 cmt.
b (1959). Thus, the trust was not without a trust res prior to the decedent's death.
The court's misunderstanding of this point forced it to consider a question not
actually raised by the case: Does the Massachusetts Testamentary Additions to
Trusts Act, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 203, § 3B (West 1990), validate a pour-over
devise to an unfunded trust? Although the Uniform Act, UNIF. TESTAMENTARY
ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT § 1, 8A U.L.A. 603 (1983), which is incorporated into
the pre-1990 UPC as § 2-511, is somewhat unclear on this point, the court in Clymer
held that the Massachusetts statute authorizes pour-over devises to unfunded trusts.
As revised in 1990, § 2-511 makes it clear that a pour-over devise to an unfunded
trust is authorized. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-511(a), 8 U.LA. 119 (Supp. 1992).
1990 UPC § 2-511 has now been promulgated as part of a revised Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.
16 Clymer, 473 N.E.2d at 1092-93.
17 See, e.g., Miller v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1981). In
Miller the court held a similar statute to be applicable to an unfunded life-insurance
trust. The testator's will devised the residue of his estate to the trustee of the life-
insurance trust. The court held that the pour-over devise incorporated the life-
insurance trust into the will by reference, causing the revocation statute to apply.
18 See, e.g., Pepper v. Peacher, 742 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1987) (retirement-plan
beneficiary designation); Estate of Adams, 288 A.2d 514 (Pa. 1972) (retirement-plan
beneficiary designation); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Stitzel, 1 Pa. Fiduc. 2d
316 (C.P. 1981) (life-insurance beneficiary designation).
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2. 1990 UPC Provision
a. General Description
The 1990 UPC expands the divorce provision to cover all the
will substitutes, including revocable inter-vivos trusts, life-insurance
and retirement-plan beneficiary designations, payable-on-death
accounts, and other revocable predivorce dispositions made by a
divorced individual to the former spouse.19 A few states have
enacted piecemeal legislation that revokes certain will substitutes
upon divorce, but no state has enacted a provision as comprehensive
as the 1990 UPC provision.20 Unless a governing instrument or
other relevant document provides otherwise, 21 1990 UPC section 2-
804(b)(1) revokes not only the provision to Elaine in Ben's will, but
also the provisions to Elaine in Ben's retirement plan, life-insurance
policy, and revocable inter-vivos trust.
19 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b), 8 U.LA. 163 (Supp. 1992).
20 Michigan and Ohio have statutes transforming spousal joint tenancies in land
into tenancies in common upon the spouses' divorce. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.102 (West 1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.20(C)(5) (Anderson 1989).
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have recently enacted legislation effecting a
revocation of provisions for the settlor's former spouse in revocable inter-vivos trusts.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.62 (Anderson Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§ 175 (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-115 (Supp. 1990) (applies to
revocable and irrevocable inter-vivos trusts unless, among other things, "the trust
agreement ... expressly provides otherwise."). Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Texas have provisions relating to the consequence of divorce on life-insurance and
retirement-plan beneficiary designations. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.101 (West
1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.63 (Anderson Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 178 (West Supp. 1991); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. §§ 3.632-.633 (West Supp.
1990).
21 Section 2-804 is inapplicable if "a governing instrument, a court order, or a
contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced
individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment" provides otherwise.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b), 8 U.LA. 163 (Supp. 1992).
WINTER 1992
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The 1990 UPC will also not allow Elaine to take the joint
tenancy property by survivorship. Section 2-804(b)(2) severs the
former spouses' ownership interests in property held by them at the
time of the divorce (or annulment) as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship and transforms their interests into a tenancy in com-
mon.' In effect, section 2-804(b)(2) aligns joint tenancies with
tenancies by the entirety, which are automatically severed upon the
tenants' divorce. The severance of spousal joint tenancies upon
divorce merely applies the general principle of the 1990 revisions that
all revocable dispositions are presumptively revoked upon divorce.
A joint tenancy is unilaterally severable, meaning that each spouse
can revoke the other's survivorship interest in half of the property.
If Elaine does not benefit under Ben's documents, who does?
Conventional statutes resolve that question by invoking the fiction
that Elaine predeceased Ben. In consequence, Ben's property would
apparently pass to Elaine's parents as alternative beneficiaries.23
Because such an outcome appears inconsistent with Ben's likely
intent, the 1990 UPC also revokes any disposition to the former
22 Id. § 2-804(b)(2).
23 In several cases, treating the former spouse as having predeceased the
testator triggered a gift in the governing instrument to the former spouse's relatives
who, after the divorce, were no longer relatives of the testator. See Porter v. Porter,
286 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa 1979) (concluding that the distribution of the testator's estate
to the stepson would occur because of the spouse's inability to take under the will for
any reason, including divorce); Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1985)
(treating the former spouse as having predeceased meant that former spouse's nieces
and nephews succeeded to interest in trust); Estate of Coffed, 387 N.E.2d 1209 (N.Y.
1979) (stating that a former spouse's child by a prior marriage could succeed to an
estate interest); Bloom v. Selfon, 555 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1989) (reflecting that the
testator's divorce does not nullify alternative distribution provisions in favor of the
former spouse's uncle because the law presumed that the former spouse predeceased
the testator); Estate of Graef, 368 N.W.2d 633 (Wis. 1985) (treating former spouse
as having predeceased the testator meant the testator's estate passed to the former
spouse's mother).
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spouse's relatives.2 The rationale is that the divorce process
severely weakens any ties between the transferor and the former
spouse's relatives. Accordingly, the 1990 UPC would revoke the
disposition to Elaine's parents.2s
b. ERISA Preemption of State Law?
As noted above,26 1990 UPC section 2-804 revokes the
provision to Elaine in Ben's retirement plan. If the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)27 covers Ben's
retirement plan, however, a risk exists that ERISA will preempt the
statutory provision. In federalizing pension and employee benefit
law, ERISA provides that the provisions of Titles I and IV of ERISA
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" governed by
ERISA.28
ERISA's preemption clause is extraordinarily broad. It does not
merely preempt state laws that conflict with specific provisions in
2 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1), 8 U.L.A. 163 (Supp. 1992). In the
somewhat comparable "slayer-rule" provision, § 2-803 nullifies all revocable transfers
to a murderer but not to the murderer's relatives. Id. § 2-803, 8 U.L.A. 159-61. The
rationale for the distinction between divorce and murder is that, in the case of
divorce, the relatives of each former spouse are likely to side with that former
spouse. A murderer's relatives, however, seem just as likely to sympathize with the
murderer's victim as with the murderer.
25 Under § 2-804(d), the effect of revocation is that the governing instrument
takes effect as if the divorced individual's former spouse and relatives of the former
spouse had disclaimed the revoked provisions. Id § 2-804(d), 8 U.L.A. 163.
2 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27 Pub. L No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 892 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989)).
28 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
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ERISA. It preempts "any and all State laws" insofar as they "relate
to" any ERISA-governed employee benefit plan.
A complex body of case law has arisen concerning the question
of whether to apply ERISA to preempt state law in circumstances in
which ERISA supplies no substantive rule. For example, until 1984,
ERISA contained no authorization for the enforcement of state
domestic relations decrees against pension accounts, but the federal
courts were virtually unanimous in refusing to apply ERISA
preemption against such state decrees.29 The Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 (REACT)30 amended ERISA by adding provisions
confirming the judicially created exception for state domestic
relations decrees.31
The federal courts have been less certain about whether to
defer to state probate law. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Hanslp,32 the court held that ERISA preempted an Oklahoma
statute33 resembling 1990 UPC section 2-804Y Both statutes pur-
port to extend the revocation-upon-divorce provision common in will
statutes to ERISA-covered death benefits. On the other hand, in
29 See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
30 Pub. L No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 29
U.S.C.).
31 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(d)(3), 1441(b)(7) (1988).
32 939 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1991).
33 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 178 (West Supp. 1992).
34 See also Board of Trustees of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust
Fund. v. H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1987) (ERISA preempted
Montana nonclaim statute, which is similar to § 3-803 of the 1990 UPC); cf Albamis
v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991) (ERISA preempted any community-property
law right of a deceased wife to devise half of her surviving husband's pension
benefits).
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Mendez-Bellido v. Board of Trustees of Division 1181, A. T. U.,I s the
court applied the New York "slayer-rule" despite an ERISA
preemption claim, reasoning that "state laws prohibiting murderers
from receiving death benefits are relatively uniform [and therefore]
there is little threat of creating a 'patchwork scheme of regulation"'
that ERISA seeks to avoid?6
It is hoped that the federal courts will show sensitivity to the
primary role of state law in the field of probate and nonprobate
transfers. Otherwise, ERISA preemption will stifle long-overdue
advancements in state probate and nonprobate law without providing
any compensating federal rule. To the extent that the federal judges
think themselves unable to craft exceptions to ERISA's preemption
language, however, another avenue is open to them. They can apply
state law concepts as federal common law. Because the UPC
contemplates multistate applicability, it is well suited to be the model
for federal common-law absorption.
Another avenue of reconciliation between ERISA preemption
and the primacy of state law in this field is envisioned in 1990 UPC
section 2-804(h)(2). 37 That subsection imposes a personal liability
for pension payments (or their value) that pass to a person who, not
for value, receives a payment to which the recipient is not entitled.
Section 2-804(h)(2) of the 1990 UPC operates in a manner similar to
a constructive trust by obligating the recipient to return the payment
(or to pay the amount of the payment) to the person who would
have been entitled to the payment were section 2-804 not preempted.
This provision respects ERISA's concern that federal law govern the
administration of the plan, while still preventing the unjust enrich-
ment that would result if an unintended recipient were to be paid the
pension benefits. In the absence of conflicting substantive policies or
provisions, federal law properly has no interest in working a broader
35 709 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
3 Id at 332 (footnote omitted) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987)).
37 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(h)(2), 8 U.LA. 164 (Supp. 1992).
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disruption of state probate and nonprobate transfer law than is
required in the interest of smooth administration of pension and
employee benefit plans.ss
38 There is no direct authority on the question of whether ERISA preempts a
state statute such as 1990 UPC § 2-804(h)(2) that imposes a personal liability on a
recipient to turn over a payment or pay its value to the person properly entitled to
it under that statute. There is authority that the Federal Employees' Group Life
Insurance Act (FEGLIA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 592 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1988)), does not preempt imposing a
constructive trust on FEGLIA-governed life-insurance proceeds after they have been
paid to a recipient. See Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 1346, 1353
(7th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that imposing a constructive trust "would not do 'major
damage' to any 'clear and substantial federal interests."); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d
566, 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (reasoning that "[t]o accept the proposition that
Congress intended the named beneficiary on the last filed designation of beneficiary
form to be the person entitled to keep the proceeds of the policy, regardless of the
surrounding circumstances, [would place] hundreds of years of well-developed law at
the fatal mercy of a statutory provision intended solely to promote administrative
convenience and the expeditious payment of claims.").
Both the Rollins and Kidd courts distinguished Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S.
46 (1981), which held that the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA),
Pub. L. No. 89-214, 79 Stat. 880 (1965) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 765-776
(1988)), preempted the post-payment imposition of a constructive trust on SGLIA-
governed life-insurance proceeds, on the ground that SGLIA contains an anti-
attachment provision, but FEGLIA does not. SGLIA § 770(g) provides that
"[playments of benefits due.., under [SGLIA].. . shall not be liable to attachment,
levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or
after receipt by the beneficiary." 38 U.S.C. § 770(g) (1988) (emphasis added). The
court in Kidd noted that "[i]f Congress had desired to totally pre-empt all state law
claims it would have included an anti-attachment provision to FEGLIA." Kidd, 821
S.W.2d at 571.
ERISA, like FEGLIA, contains no anti-attachment provision. ERISA does
contain an anti-alienation provision, ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)
(1988), but that provision only requires each ERISA-governed pension plan to
prohibit the assignment or alienation of benefits before payment. See Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836 (1988) (5-4 decision)
("Section 206(d)(1) bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits, and
thus prohibits the use of state enforcement mechanisms only insofar as they prevent
those benefits from being paid to plan participants." (second emphasis added)).
Although, as noted supra note 28 and accompanying text, ERISA's preemption
provision, ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988), is one of unusual breadth,
the Supreme Court in Mackey held that it does not preempt state-law pre-payment
garnishment of individual participants' benefits under ERISA-governed employee
welfare benefit plans to satisfy money judgments awarded against those participants
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c. Constitutionality of Section 2-804 Under the Contracts
Clause
The implementation of 1990 UPC section 2-804 could create a
problem regarding Ben's life-insurance policy if Ben designated
Elaine as beneficiary before the effective date of section 2-804.
Although, under UPC section 8-101(b)(5), the provisions of section
2-804 apply to "instruments executed.., before the effective date [of
the enactment] unless there is a clear indication of a contrary
intent,"39 a recent decision of the Eighth Circuit, Whirlpool Corp. v.
Ritter,4 raises a concern regarding the constitutionality of applying
rules of construction such as UPC section 2-804 to third-party
beneficiary contract designations that were executed before the
effective date of the statute. The court in Ritter held that the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution 41 prohibited the
application of the same Oklahoma statute that was embroiled in the
Hanslip litigation to pre-existing life-insurance beneficiary designa-
tions.42 As noted above, this is the Oklahoma statute that resembles
1990 UPC section 2-804 and extends the revocation-upon-divorce
rule to will substitutes such as life insurance.43 In Ritter the dece-
dent's revocable designation of his former spouse as his life-insurance
beneficiary was executed before the enactment of the statute but the
divorce that revoked it (and, of course, the decedent's death)
in independent causes of action, despite the fact that forcing the plan to honor the
garnishment orders caused the plan to incur significant administrative burdens and
costs. ERISA's anti-alienation provision would block pre-payment garnishment
proceedings under state law, but that provision only applies to pension plans, not to
employee welfare benefit plans. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 837-38.
39 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 8-101(b)(5), 8 U.L.A. 566 (1983).
4o 929 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1991).
41 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
42 Ritter, 929 F.2d at 1322.
43 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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occurred after enactment."4
The Joint Editorial Board (JEB) for the Uniform Probate Code
has issued a statement expressing its disapproval of the Ritter
decision. 45 The JEB statement makes four points in arguing that
Ritter is wrong and should not be followed elsewhere. In summary,
those four points are, first, that the beneficiary-designation in a life-
insurance policy is a donative transfer. The statute does not impair
the contractual component of the policy, the insurance company's
obligation to pay the proceeds to any person the insured names as
beneficiary. The statute only affects the identity of the donee. Thus,
the statute does not properly raise any Contracts Clause issue.
Second, the statute merely establishes a rule of construction
designed to implement intention. It reflects a legislative judgment
that when the insured leaves unaltered a will, trust, or insurance-
beneficiary designation in favor of an ex-spouse, the insured's failure
to designate substitute takers more likely than not represents
inattention rather than intention. The legislative judgment yields to
a contrary intention.
Third, the Contracts Clause has never been read to pose any
obstacle to the application of legislatively altered constructional rules
to pre-existing donative documents such as revocable trusts that have
no contractual component. There is therefore no justification for
extending Contracts Clause concerns to a statute that only affects the
revocable, donative-transfer component of a life-insurance policy.
Fourth, the JEB found no Supreme Court authority for the
Eighth Circuit's intrusion of the Contracts Clause into the area of
44 Ritter, 929 F.2d at 1319-20.
45 The full statement is published in Joint Editorial Board Statement Regarding
the Constitutionality of Changes in Default Rules asApplied to Pre-Existing Documents,
17 AM. C. TR. & EsT. COUNS. NOTEs 184 (1991), and is available from the
headquarters office of the NCCUSL. See also S. Alan Medlin, Joint Editorial Board
Rebukes Eighth Circuit Decision, PROB. PRAC. REP., Jan. 1992, at 1.
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legislative default rules." In fact, the Eighth Circuit's approach is
at variance with the Supreme Court's recent tolerance of retroactive
federal legislation imposing liabilities under the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MEPPA).47 When an
employer withdraws from an underfunded pension plan, MEPPA
allows the imposition of significant unforeseen liabilities. Yet, the
Supreme Court has rejected both due process and uncompensated
takings objections to these retroactively imposed MEPPA obliga-
tions.48
B. Section 2-102: The Spouse's Share in Intestate Succession
To examine this section, let us turn the clock back and give Ben
and Elaine another chance. Not only did the couple marry, but they
beat the odds and stayed married. In fact, they had a wonderful
marriage. But eventually the law of mortality, which even the
uniform law commissioners cannot repeal, caught up to Ben, and he
died intestate. Elaine survived, along with their two adult children
and a number of grandchildren. In this version of the marriage, Ben
was a procrastinator and never got around to seeing an estate
planning attorney.
Under these circumstances, what is, or should be, Elaine's share
in intestate succession? Section 2-102(1) of the 1990 UPC grants
46The principal Supreme Court precedent upon which the Eighth Circuit relied
in Ritter was Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). Spannaus
held unconstitutional a Minnesota statute that retroactively increased the pension
obligations that a company would owe to its workers when the company ceased
operations in Minnesota or terminated the plan. By contrast, in Ritter, there was no
increase, decrease, or other interference with the obligation of the insurer to pay the
contractual proceeds.
47 Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1461 (1988)).
48 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
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Elaine the entire intestate estate,49 even though the couple's two
children also survived Ben.so In fact, the 1990 UPC would grant
Elaine the entire intestate estate even if she and Ben had not had
children, because neither of Ben's parents survived.
In all other cases, the surviving spouse's intestate share is a
lump sum plus a fraction of the remaining balance.51 If the dece-
dent leaves a parent but no children, the surviving spouse's share is
the first $200,000 plus three-fourths of the remaining balance.5 2 If
all of the decedent's surviving children are also children of the
surviving spouse, but the surviving spouse has one or more surviving
children who are not biological or adopted children of the decedent,
the surviving spouse's share is the first $150,000 plus one-half of the
remaining balance.5 3 Finally, if the decedent leaves one or more
surviving children who are not biological or adopted children of the
surviving spouse, the surviving spouse's share is the first $100,000
49 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1), 8 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1992). Under the pre-
1990 UPC, the sole instance in which the surviving spouse was granted the entire
intestate estate was when the decedent left no surviving issue and no surviving
parent. Id, 8 U.L.A. 59 (1983) (amended 1990). Elaine would receive the first
$50,000 plus one-half of the remaining balance under the pre-1990 UPC. Id. § 2-
102(3).
so For shorthand purposes, I use the term "children" to refer not only to children
but also to descendants of deceased children.
51 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(2)-(4), 8 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1992).
52 Id. § 2-102(2). For the rationale of this approach, see infra note 65. Under
the pre-1990 UPC, the surviving spouse was granted the first $50,000 plus one-half
of the remaining balance. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(2), 8 U.L.A. 59 (1983)
(amended 1990).
53 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(3), 8 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1992). Under the pre-
1990 UPC, the surviving spouse was granted the first $50,000 plus one-half of the
remaining balance. Id, 8 U.L.A. 59 (1983) (amended 1990).
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plus one-half of the remaining balance.5 4
In sum, the two instances in which the surviving spouse's share
is potentially less than the full amount of the intestate estate are (1)
when the decedent leaves no surviving children but is survived by a
parent and (2) when the decedent has children and either the
decedent or the surviving spouse has children who are not children of
the other. In the hypothetical, no reduction would occur because
Ben's parents predeceased him and his marriage to Elaine was the
first marriage for each.
Suppose that after Ben died intestate, Elaine married Carl, who
was either a widower or a divorc& Some years later, Elaine died
intestate survived by Carl. Because Elaine left children by her
marriage to Ben, Carl would not necessarily take Elaine's entire
intestate estate. Carl's share would be the first $100,000 plus half of
the remaining balance, with Elaine's children by her marriage to Ben
receiving the other half.SS Had Elaine and Ben been childless and
had Elaine and Carl had children by their marriage to each other,
Carl's share would depend upon whether he had children by a prior
marriage. If he did, Carl's share would be the first $150,000 plus half
of the remaining balance, with Elaine's children receiving the other
half of the remaining balance. 6 If Carl had no children by a prior
marriage and Elaine's parents predeceased her, his intestate share
would be the entire intestate estate.5 7
To understand the rationale of the 1990 revisions, first consider
Elaine's share in Ben's intestate estate, and then Carl's share in
Elaine's intestate estate. A mixture of considerations drive, or should
54 Id. § 2-102(4), 8 U.LA. 72 (Supp. 1992). Under the pre-1990 UPC, the
surviving spouse was granted one-half of the intestate estate. Id., 8 U.L.A. 59 (1983)
(amended 1990).
11 Id. § 2-102(4), 8 U.LA. 72 (Supp. 1992).
56 Id. § 2-102(3).
17 Id. § 2-102(1).
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drive, the formulation of intestate-succession laws. The most obvious
and perhaps predominant consideration is the decedent's intention.
Of course, the law gives effect to intention by imputation. The 1990
UPC imputes to Ben the intention to give all his property to Elaine.
Several items of evidence support this imputation. One is that
empirical studies reveal that testators tend to grant their entire
estates to the surviving spouse, even when the decedent has surviving
children.58 Another is the trend in intestate-succession law through-
out the United States and Europe toward granting ever-increasing
shares to surviving spouses.59 In The Transformation of Family Law,
58 Some of the studies were based on an examination of the probated wills of
similarly situated decedents who died during a particular time frame in a particular
locality. See MARVIN B. SUssMAN ET AL, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 86, 89-
90, 143-45 (1970); Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the
United States and England, 67 MICH. L REV. 1303, 1307-08 (1969); Allison Dunham,
The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmissions at Death, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 241,252 (1963); William W. Gibson, Jr., Inheritance of Community Property in
Texas-A Need for Reform, 47 TEx. L REV. 359, 364-66 (1969); John R. Price, The
Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50 WASH. L
REV. 277, 283, 311-17 (1975).
Other studies were based on interviews with living persons. See Mary L.
Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 351-55, 358-
64, 366-68 (finding that the majority favored granting entire estate to the spouse
regardless of the level of wealth involved); see also UNITED KINGDOM LAW
COMMISSION, No. 187, REPORT ON FAMILY LAW. DISTRIB]TION ON INTESTACY 28
(1989) (reporting that 72% of respondents favored granting the entire estate to the
surviving spouse if the decedent owned a house and the decedent's children were
adults, 79% favored granting the entire estate to the surviving spouse if the decedent
had a house and young children, and 79% favored granting the entire estate to the
surviving spouse if the decedent had no house but had young children); Note, A
Comparison of Iowans'Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and
Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L REV. 1041, 1089-90 (1978) (finding that the
percentage who favored granting the entire estate to the spouse decreased as the
level of wealth increased).
59 A recent report of the United Kingdom Law Commission recommended
granting the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate in all circumstances. UNITED
KINGDOM LAW COMMISSION, No. 187, REPORT ON FAMILY LAW. DISTR1BUTION ON
INTESTACY 8-12 (1989).
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Mary Ann Glendon calls this trend the "shrinking circle of heirs"
phenomenon.60 Glendon writes that throughout the United States
and Europe, "the position of the surviving spouse has steadily
improved everywhere at the expense of the decedent's blood
relatives."61  Glendon points out that this trend "strikingly illus-
trate[s] the movement of modern marriage into the foreground of
family relationships."62 This trend signifies "the gradual attenuation
of legal bonds among family members outside the conjugal unit of
husband, wife, and children"63 and "[t]he tendency to view a mar-
riage that lasts until death as a union of the economic interests of the
spouses.""
Granting the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate when
neither spouse has surviving children by a prior marriage or when the
decedent has no surviving children or parent65 therefore conforms
60 MARY A. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMAnON OF FAMILY LAw 238 (1989).
61 I.
62 Id at 239.
63 Id at 238.
6 Id at 240.
65 If the decedent is childless, the 1990 UPC grants the surviving spouse the
entire intestate estate if the decedent leaves no surviving parent. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-102(1), 8 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1992). If the decedent leaves a surviving
parent, the 1990 UPC grants the surviving spouse the first $200,000 (actually, the
first $243,000 including the applicable probate exemptions and allowances) plus
three-fourths of the remaining balance. Id § 2-102(2). Very few intestate estates
exceed $243,000, and even fewer exceed this sum by any substantial margin. Thus,
the surviving spouse will usually receive the entire intestate estate even when the
decedent is childless but leaves a surviving parent.
The rationale for not granting the entire intestate estate to the surviving
spouse is that a childless decedent, who is survived by a spouse and a parent and
who died intestate with an estate in excess of $243,000, probably died relatively
young and without expecting to have such a large estate. Decedents who accumulate
estates of this size are typically older and have wills. See Fellows, supra note 58, at
336-39 (reporting that, among those surveyed, 69% with estates of $200,000 and over
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with modern trends. Observe, however, the other side of the
equation. As Professor Glendon noted, granting the surviving spouse
the entire intestate estate comes "at the expense of the decedent's
blood relatives.""6
Of course, in the competition for the decedent's property, not
all blood relatives are created equal. Intestate-succession laws must
rank blood relatives by category or degree of relationship. Under the
1990 UPC, the categories of relatives that lose to the surviving
spouse are (1) the decedent's children (or descendants of deceased
children) and (2) the decedent's collateral relatives and ancestors
more remote than parents.
67
Between these two categories, decedents typically assume that
their children have higher claims to their property than do their
collateral relatives or ancestors more remote than parents. On the
surface, the 1990 UPC does not treat the two categories different-
ly-it grants the surviving spouse the entire estate to the exclusion of
had wills (the $200,000 figure is doubled to adjust for inflation between the
publication of the article and today), 61% of those age 46-54 had wills, 63% of those
age 55-64 had wills, and 85% of those 65 and over had wills, but only 12% of those
between the ages of 17 and 34 had wills).
Intestate estates of over $243,000 often include a large tort recovery.
Reconsider Ben and Elaine. Suppose that shortly after their marriage, Ben was
injured on his way to work by a negligent truck driver employed by a large, publicly
held corporation, and that Ben eventually died from those injuries. Under many
survival-type statutes, the tort recovery becomes part of the decedent's estate, to be
distributed as other estate assets. See, e.g., UNIF. LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL
SURVIVAL AND DEATH ACT § 2(b), 8A U.LA. 591 (1983) (last amended 1979); 4
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL, LAW OF TORTS § 25.16, at 614 nn. 8-9 (2d ed. 1986).
Suppose that Ben's estate, swelled by a tort recovery, stemming from the accident,
amounted to $1 million. Disregarding the probate exemptions and allowances, the
advantage of the 1990 UPC formula is that it grants a thoroughly adequate sum of
$800,000 ($200,000 plus $600,000) to Elaine (who might remarry) and $200,000 to
Ben's parents (who bore the cost of raising and educating Ben). See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-102(2), 8 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1992).
6GLENDON, supra note 60, at 238.
67 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102, 8 U.LA. 72 (Supp. 1992).
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both categories. In fact, however, the decision to exclude these
categories was based on entirely different assumptions.
The 1990 UPC presumes that decedents see their children as
winners, not losers. The decedents view their surviving spouses as
performing dual functions as primary beneficiaries and as conduits
through which to benefit their children. If Ben died prematurely,
when his children were minors, Elaine would be better equipped to
use Ben's property for herself and for the children's benefit. If Ben
died at an older age, when the children were middle-aged working
adults, Elaine would also be older with greater economic needs than
the children. In the latter case, the conduit theory assumes that
Ben's children will eventually inherit any unconsumed portion of his
property from Elaine.
The conduit theory does not apply to decedents' collateral
relatives or ancestors more remote than parents. They will likely
suffer a permanent "loss." When a decedent leaves only a surviving
spouse and collateral relatives or ancestors more remote than
parents, the typical decedent sees the surviving spouse as the sole
beneficiary. The decedent does not ordinarily expect the surviving
spouse to share any significant portion of the decedent's property
with those other relatives.
In Elaine and Carl's hypothetical marriage, if Elaine and Ben
had children (whether or not Elaine also had children with Carl),
Carl would receive an intestate share of the first $100,000 plus half
of the remaining balance, and Elaine's children would receive the
other half.6 If Elaine had children with Carl but none with Ben,
Carl's intestate share is the first $150,000 plus half of the remaining
balance if Carl had children by a prior marriage.69 Elaine's children
would receive the other half.70
68 See id. § 2-102(4).
69 See id. § 2-102(3).
70 See id.
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The rationale for this is that the existence of children who are
not joint children renders the conduit theory problematic. When a
decedent is survived by children not descended from the surviving
spouse, or by children of the surviving spouse not descended from
the decedent, the surviving spouse has divided loyalties and is a less
reliable conduit. If the surviving spouse in either of these instances
were to be granted the entire intestate estate, the likelihood of the
decedent's children recouping their "loss" by inheriting from the
surviving spouse the unconsumed portion of the decedent's property
would be less secure. The existence of children from a prior
marriage-on either side-creates a moral conflict regarding how the
surviving spouse should divide the property inherited from the
decedent. 71 When the surviving spouse later dies, his or her natural
instinct is to leave a will treating all of his or her own children
equally. And, if the surviving spouse dies intestate, the intestate-
succession law automatically grants those children equal shares.
Thus, the problem in the stepparent situations becomes one of
striking a reasonable balance between the claims of the surviving
spouse and the decedent's children. The dominant objective is to
grant the surviving spouse an adequate share. To achieve this
objective, the 1990 UPC grants a share to the surviving spouse
commensurate with the estate size and the family circumstances. 72
The UPC implements this idea by means of the lump-sum-plus-a-
fraction-of-the-remaining-balance device.73 In the typical small or
modest intestate estate, this device grants the surviving spouse the
entire estate, especially because the 1990 UPC gives the probate
exemptions and allowances ($43,000 is the typical amount) to the
71 By necessity, the UPC disregards the possibility that the same moral conflict
will arise after the decedent's death, should the surviving spouse remarry and have
children by a new spouse. Intestate succession law is forced to base the amount
awarded to the surviving spouse on facts existing at the decedent's death. See
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Maniage Society and Spousal Rights Under the
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IowA L. REv. 223, 234-35 (1991).
72 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102, 8 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1992).
73id.
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surviving spouse.74
In the larger intestate estates, infrequent though they may be,
the 1990 UPC assumes that the wealthier intestate decedent would
not consider that a provision for children would deprive the surviving
spouse of an adequate share. Thus, to provide the decedent's
children with some protection against the claims of the surviving
spouse's other children, the 1990 UPC reserves a share in the larger
intestate estates for the decedent's own children.75
Because the moral conflict is more acute when the decedent
leaves children from a prior marriage than when only the surviving
spouse has children from a prior marriage, different formulas are
employed to determine the surviving spouse's share in each scenario.
In the former case, the surviving spouse is granted the first $100,000
(typically $143,000 after including the minimum probate exemptions
and allowances) plus fifty percent of the remaining balance.76 In
the latter case, the surviving spouse is granted the first $150,000
(typically $193,000 after including the minimum probate exemptions
and allowances) plus fifty percent of the remaining balance.77
Lest granting the surviving spouse a minimum claim on the first
$100,000 appears over-generous, and hence unfair to the decedent's
children by the prior marriage, consider that decedents dying
intestate are typically older than 6079 and have estates below
74 See id. §§ 2-404 to -405, 8 U.L.A. 107-08.
7 1 Id. § 2-102(3)-(4), 8 U.L.A. 72.
76 d § 2-102(4).
77 Id § 2-102(3).
78 Although younger people overwhelmingly do not have wills, see Mary L.
Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 336-39, and
so the great majority of those dying young die intestate, they die in even lower
numbers than might be guessed. Only about 0.5% of the population, married and
-nmarried, die between ages 20 and 25, another 0.6% die between ages 25 and 30,
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$200,000. 79  Their surviving spouses will likely be wives, not hus-
bands, for wives tend to outlive their husbands. This is not only
because women live longer than men,80 but also because wives tend
to be, on average, nearly three years younger than their husbands.81
It should not be surprising, therefore, that married women of middle
age, on average, will become widowed before turning seventy and will
live fifteen more years.8 2
What are the needs of these surviving spouses? They are, by
and large, beyond working years. This forces them to rely to a great
extent on capital-generated income and makes them vulnerable to
the ebbs and flows of interest rates.93 Apart from their social
and another 0.5% die between ages 30 and 35. That adds up to 1.6% dying between
20 and 35. Indeed, only another 0.7% die between ages 35 and 40, so that only 3.3%
die in the two decades between ages 20 and 40. It is between ages 60 and 90 that
we get serious about dying, for that is the period in which nearly three-fourths of the
population die. See 1 Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (CCH) 6415.301, tbl. 80CNSMT,
at 6961 (1989). Although most people age 65 and older have wills, the minority who
die without wills make up a much larger number of people than the cohort of young
people who die prematurely.
79 In terms of wealth, 72.3% of persons with estates valued between $0 and
$99,999 do not have wills, 49.8% with estates between $100,000 and $199,999 do not
have wills, but only 15.4% with estates between $200,000 and $1 million do not have
wills. See Fellows, supra note 78, at 338 tbl. 4. The estate figures have been
adjusted for inflation. Between 1977, when the surveys were conducted, and 1992,
the consumer price index has about doubled. To reflect this increase in inflation, the
figures reported in the original article have been doubled.
80 Average life expectancy is projected to be 78 years for women, 72 years for
men. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATE--1991, at 73 tbl. 105 (111th ed. 1991).
81 See id. at 88 tbl. 132.
82 Jon Nordheimer, A New Abuse of Elderly: Theft by Kin and Friends, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at Al, A12.
83 See Robert Lewis, More Folks Feel Pinch, AM. ASS'N. RETIRED PERSONS
BuLL., Mar. 1992, at 1, 12 [hereinafter Lewis, More Folks Feel Pinch] ("[R]esearchers
at Economic Analysis Associates in Stowe, Vt., estimate that for every percentage
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security payments and perhaps a small pension, the principal source
of income for nonworking surviving spouses is the income they earn
on their investments.14 For elderly surviving spouses of less wealthy
decedents, those who are most likely to die intestate, that means the
interest they earn on their certificates of deposit.s As of 1991,
average social security payments barely exceeded the poverty level.
The excess was only $34 a month for nondisabled widows and
widowers and only $76 a month for retired workers.M Contrary to
the image of the elderly as "fat cats living the good life at the
point drop in interest rates, investors 65 years and older lose $15 billion of income.
The loss for persons between 55 and 64 is calculated at $4 billion."); John Liscio,
Exploding Some Popular Myths, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 16, 1992, at 60
("Economist Susan Stearne calculates that each 1 percentage point drop in [short-
term interest] rates costs the over-55 set about $19 billion in interest income .... ").
84 As of 1990, according to the United States Census Bureau, the principal
sources of income for persons over 65 were social security (37.8%), earnings
(15.5%), pensions (16.9%), and investments (24.7%). See Robert Lewis, Ups and
Downs of the 1980s: New Income Data Refutes [sic] 'Fat Cat' Age Stereotype, Am.
ASS'N RETIRED PERSONS BULL, Feb. 1992, at 1, 15 [hereinafter Lewis, Ups and
Downs of the 1980s]. Another study, conducted in Florida, found that, in 1990, social
security was the main source of income for 44% of those 60 and over. See Catherine
Wilson, Interest-Rate Plunge Chills Savers, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Feb. 9, 1992, at C5.
8s The Public Policy Institute of the American Association of Retired Persons
reports that people 65 and over derive 17.5% of their income from interest-bearing
accounts, compared to just 5.5% for those 45 through 64 and 3% for those under 45.
See Lewis, More Folks Feel Pinch, supra note 83, at 12.
" Average social security payments were $6,672 per year or $556 per month for
nondisabled widows and widowers and $7,236 per year or $603 per month ($679 per
month for men, $518 per month for women) for retired workers. See SOCIAL SEC.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN:
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT-1991, at 2, 178, 196 (1991).
As of 1990, the poverty level for single persons age 65 and over was $6,268
per year or $522 per month. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES-1990, at 195 tbl. A-2 (1991). The government's
"poverty index" is a very crude measure, however. It is based largely on outdated
assumptions concerning consumption behavior. By one study, "if the consumption
standards used to calculate the index were updated, it would raise aged poverty by
at least 50 percent." James H. Schulz, Poverty Level-Worn-Out Words to Hide the
Truth, Am. ASS'N RETIRED PERSONS BULL, Mar. 1992, at 18, 18.
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expense of everybody else,"8 7 government reports indicate that
"[tlwenty percent of all elderly widows were poor."8 About forty
percent of the elderly, in fact, are either poor or near-poor, "near-
poor" being defined as having income no more than two times the
poverty level. 89 A Florida study recently found that thirty-one
percent of those sixty and over reported incomes of less than $10,000
annually.90
Given these demographic characteristics of intestates and their
surviving spouses, I think we must next make certain basic assump-
tions about the marriage itself and the decedent's motives. Sound
public policy, I believe, requires that we assume that the marriage is
solid (that the partners remain committed to one another) and that
the decedent has what may be described as "just" motives. After all,
the marriages we are talking about have ended in death, not divorce,
and there has been no effort by the decedent to disinherit his or her
surviving spouse. To assume that those marriages are other than
solid would be to make a distinctly unfortunate cultural statement
about the institution of marriage in American society. Included
within the assumption that decedents have "just" motives are that
decedents mean to be generous to their surviving spouses, mean to
strike a fair balance between their surviving spouses and children
(that is, to be fair to all), but, above all, in striking that fair balance,
mean at the very least to provide economic security for their
surviving spouses.91 The link, of course, between need and intention
87 Lewis, Ups and Downs of the 1980s, supra note 84, at 14.
8 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION PROFILE
OF THE UNITED STATEs-1989, at 41 (1989).
89 Lewis, Ups and Downs of the 1980s, supra note 84, at 15.
90 See Wilson, supra note 84, at C5.
91 Obviously, not all marriages are ideal and not all decedents have "just"
motives. But these assumptions are not unfair to people whose marriages or motives
fall outside the mold. Decedents whose marriages are less than ideal must be
expected to understand that their situation calls for individuated action. They must
make their own wills (or get divorced).
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is that need shapes intention-the surviving spouse's need for
economic security shapes decedents' intentions or, more accurately,
shapes the intentions that the state should properly attribute to
decedents.
At today's CD interest rates of around four percent, 92 $100,000
generates only $333 a month ($4,000 a year) in income. With
average social security payments added in, the surviving spouse's
income only rises to $889 a month ($10,668 a year), which is a mere
$367 a month ($4,404 a year) above the poverty level. This still puts
the surviving spouse into the category of the near-poor (defined as
persons with incomes less than twice the poverty level). Even if
short-term interest rates return to the eight percent level, which is
where they were a year and a half ago, the income yield rises only
$333 a month ($4,000 a year). A surviving spouse who only has
social security and $100,000 in assets will still be in jeopardy of
outliving those assets, especially if he or she lives into deep old age,
as so many now do. To the extent that the interest plus social
security proves insufficient, capital will need to be drawn down,
perhaps to the point of exhaustion or near exhaustion.93 With high
real estate taxes and high costs of prescription drugs and other
medical procedures not covered by Medicare, not to mention nursing
92 Current interest rates on 6-month CDs ranged from 3.14% to 4% in the New
York City area and from 3.65% to 4.69% in major banks outside the New York City
area. See Elizabeth M. Fowler, Bank Yields Show Mixed Trend for Week, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1992, at D15.
93 We are currently experiencing a general inflation rate of 2 to 3%. The most
recent report puts the annual increase in the consumer price index at 2.2%.
Consumer Price IndexRises 0.3%, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992, at D21. If $100,000 is
invested in CDs yielding 4% interest, and if $10,000 is withdrawn each year (adjusted
upward for a 2% inflation rate in Year 2 and beyond), $100,000 will last only 11
years. If the same annual withdrawal is adjusted upward for a 3% inflation rate,
$100,000 will last only 10 years. Reducing annual withdrawals to, say, $7,000 extends
the period to 17 years at a 2% inflation rate and to 15 years at a 3% inflation rate.
See JANE B. QUINN, MAKING THE MosT OF YOUR MONEY 893-94 tbls. (1991).
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home expenses should that become necessary,94 the cost of living for
the elderly often rises faster than the general inflation rate.
These computations assume that the surviving spouse receives
as much as $100,000 in cash that can be invested in CDs. In fact,
some of the decedent's estate will probably be distributed in kind,
that is, in the form of specific assets that are illiquid, thus decreasing
the income-generating potential of the spouse's share.
Of course, some surviving spouses do not need a big portion of
the decedent's intestate estate for economic security. Some already
have independent means or will benefit from will substitutes such as
life insurance, pension death benefits or annuities, joint tenancies, or
joint banking or money market accounts. Because intestacy laws, by
tradition, are kept simple, however, they do not reduce the spouse's
share by the amount of the spouse's assets. Unless this constraint on
the intestacy laws is to be broken, it necessitates designing those laws
on the assumption that the surviving spouse does not have indepen-
dent means and will not benefit appreciably from will substitutes.
This approach is the only way to guarantee all surviving spouses a
minimum degree of economic security. It does require, not unfairly,
it seems to me, the decedent whose spouse has economic security to
make a will in favor of his or her children by the prior marriage, if
that is what the decedent thinks is appropriate.
94 Two out of five people over 65 will spend some time in a nursing home
during their lifetimes. Nearly 75% of all nursing home residents are women. Costs
range from $20,000 to $80,000 per year; 36% of these costs are currently borne by
Medicaid. See TEACHERS INS. & ANNUITY ASS'N, LONG-TERM CARE: A GUIDE FOR
THE EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITY 2, 11 (1992). Note that the more the intestacy laws
reduce the surviving spouse's share in order to favor adult children by a prior
marriage, the more likely it becomes that state funds will have to be expended under
Medicaid for nursing home care of the surviving spouse. This point alone should
make state legislators more sympathetic to the 1990 UPC's lump-sum-plus-a-fraction
approach than to the inheritance expectations of the decedent's adult children by a
prior marriage.
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C. Sections 2-201 to 2-207: The Redesigned Elective Share
The preceding sections demonstrate that the 1990 UPC
intestate-succession law presumes a marriage in which the decedent
wants to give the surviving spouse the entire estate. In addition, the
1990 UPC presumes that the decedent would want all of a smaller
estate and a substantial portion of a larger estate to pass to the
surviving spouse if there are no children from their marriage, even if
a parent or children from a previous marriage survive. The 1990
UPC imputes to Ben a desire to give his entire estate to Elaine and
imputes to Elaine a desire to give her estate to Carl, but it also
imputes to Elaine a desire to give some of her estate to her children
by her marriage to Ben if she has more than enough property to
provide for Carl's economic security. The law disregards all extrinsic
evidence to the contrary except documentary evidence in the form of
a valid will expressing an intent to give the spouse less or nothing at
all. Intestate-succession cases, by definition, do not involve such
documentary evidence.
The next section involves situations in which such documentary
evidence does exist. Specifically, the section addresses the situation
in which the decedent has left a will that totally or substantially
disinherits the surviving spouse.9"
1. The Partnership Theory of Marriage
Disinheritance of a surviving spouse brings into question the
fundamental nature of the economic rights of each spouse in a
marital relationship-of how society views the institution of marriage.
95 Intestate decedents may indirectly disinherit the surviving spouse by depleting
the intestate estate through gifts or will substitutes. By restricting the discussion to
decedents directly disinheriting the surviving spouse by will, I do not suggest that the
elective share is unavailable or never taken in intestacy cases.
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The contemporary view of marriage is that it is an economic
partnership.9 The partnership theory of marriage, also called the
96 One of the earliest American expressions of the partnership theory of
marriage appears in the 1963 Report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to
the President's Commission on the Status of Women. As quoted in the Prefatory Note
to the Uniform Marital Property Act, the report states: "Marriage is a partnership
to which each spouse makes a different but equally important contribution. This fact
has become increasingly recognized in the realities of American family living. While
the laws of other countries have reflected this trend, family laws in the United States
have lagged behind." UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. 97
(1987) (quoting COMM. ON CIVIL AND PouTIcAL RIoHTS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 18 (1963)).
The strength of the idea that marriage is an economic partnership is evidenced
by the recent New Jersey case of Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872 (NJ. 1990). In that
case, a husband, after having left his wife of seventeen years, died during the
pendency of a divorce proceeding initiated by his wife. Id. at 874. The husband's
will devised his entire estate to his children by a former marriage. Id. The court
held that the husband's death terminated the divorce proceeding under which the
wife would have been entitled to a share determined under New Jersey's equitable-
distribution statute. Id. at 877. The wife also had no recourse under the New Jersey
elective-share statute because that statute withheld an elective share from a surviving
spouse who was not living with the decedent at death. Id. Despite the wife's
inability to recover under either the divorce or elective-share statutes, the court held:
We conclude ... that the principle that animates both [the
equitable-distribution and elective-share] statutes is that a spouse may
acquire an interest in marital property by virtue of the mutuality of
efforts during marriage that contribute to the creation, acquisition, and
preservation of such property. This principle, primarily equitable in
nature, is derived from notions of fairness, common decency, and good
faith. Further, we are convinced that these laws do not reflect a
legislative intent to extinguish the property entitlement of a spouse who
finds himself or herself beyond the reach of either statute because the
marriage has realistically but not legally ended at the time of the other's
death.
In the exercise of their common-law jurisdiction, courts should seek
to effectuate sound public policy and mold the law to embody the
societal values that are exemplified by such public policy....
The constructive trust, we believe, is an appropriate equitable
remedy in this type of case.
The equitable remedy of constructive trust should be invoked and
imposed on the marital property under the control of the executor of
[the husband's] estate .... [The constructive trust remedy] should be
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marital-sharing theory, is expressed in various ways. Sometimes it is
portrayed "as an expression of the presumed intent of husbands and
wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share and share
alike."97 Under this approach, the economic rights of each spouse
are seen as deriving from an unspoken marital agreement in which
each spouse possesses a half interest in all property nominally
acquired by and titled in the sole name of either partner during the
marriage (excluding property acquired by gift or inheritance). A
decedent who disinherits a surviving spouse is seen as having reneged
on the bargain. Sometimes the theory is visualized in restitutionary
terms-a return-of-contribution notion. Under this approach, the law
grants each spouse an entitlement to compensation for nonmonetary
contributions to the marital enterprise, as "a recognition of the
activity of one spouse in the home and to compensate not only for
this activity but for opportunities lost."98 Sometimes the theory is
stated in aspirational and behavior shaping terms:
[T]he ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal
partnerships between spouses who share resources,
responsibilities, and risks....
From a policy standpoint, this partnership framework
is desirable both because it encourages cooperative
commitments between spouses and because it serves
broader egalitarian and caretaking objectives. In effect,
sharing principles hold promise for bridging traditional
public/private divisions between family and market. A
partnership model can cushion the impact of persistent
gender biases in couples' private allocation of homemak-
applied to avoid the unjust enrichment that would occur if the marital
property devolving to Mr. Carr's estate included the share beneficially
belonging to [the wife].
Id at 879-81 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court noted that efforts were
pending in the New Jersey legislature to eliminate the gap created by the two
statutes. Id at 879 n.3.
97 GLENDON, supra note 60, at 131.
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ing tasks and in the public allocation of salaries and
benefits. By sharing their total resources, families can
spread the risks and benefits of sex-linked roles, the
remnants of a socioeconomic system that makes it difficult
for any one individual to accommodate a full work and
family life....
Not only do partnership principles promote gender
equality; they also support caretaking commitments toward
children and elderly dependents."
No matter how the rationale is expressed, the community-
property system100 recognizes the partnership theory," 1 but the
common-law system is sometimes thought to deny it. In the ongoing
marriage, it is true that the basic principle in the common-law (title-
based) states is that marital status does not affect property owner-
ship. The regime is one of separate property. Each spouse owns all
that he or she earns. By contrast, in the community-property states,
each spouse acquires a half interest in the property the other earns
during the marriage. By granting each spouse upon acquisition an
immediate half interest in the earnings of the other, the community-
property regimes directly recognize that the couple's enterprise is in
essence collaborative.
The common-law states, however, also give effect or purport to
give effect to the partnership theory when it perhaps counts
99 Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 198-99 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) (footnote omitted).
100 1 use the term "community-property system" to include that version of
community law adopted in the Uniform Marital Property Act and enacted in
modified form in Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-.97 (West Supp. 1991).
101 As one author noted: "The crux of the community property system... is
shared ownership by husband and wife of acquisitions earned by either or both
during marriage.... Community property thus extends the notion of marriage as a
partnership to property rights of the spouses." WILUAM A. REPPY, JR., COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 1 (1980).
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most-when the marriage ends in divorce.102 If the marriage ends
in divorce, a spouse who sacrificed his or her financial earning
opportunities to contribute so-called domestic services to the marital
enterprise (such as child rearing and homemaking), or a spouse who
pursued a lower paying career or engaged in volunteer work, stands
to be recompensed. Almost all, if not all, states now follow the so-
called equitable-distribution system upon divorce, 10 3 under which
broad discretion [is given to] trial courts to assign to either
spouse property acquired during the marriage, irrespective
of title, taking into account the circumstances of the
particular case and recognizing the value of the contribu-
102 In Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496 (NJ. 1974), a landmark case
interpreting New Jersey's equitable-distribution statute, the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated:
The statute we are considering authorizes the courts, upon
divorce, to divide marital assets equitably between the spouses....
[T]he enactment seeks to right what many have felt to be a grave
wrong. It gives recognition to the essential supportive role played by
the wife in the home, acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and
mother she should clearly be entitled to a share of family assets
accumulated during the marriage. Thus the division of property upon
divorce is responsive to the concept that marriage is a shared enter-
prise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.
Only if it is clearly understood that far more than economic factors are
involved, will the resulting distribution be equitable within the true
intent and meaning of the statute. The widely pervasive effect this
remedial legislation will almost certainly have throughout our society
betokens its great significance.
Id. at 501-02 (footnote and citation omitted). Although in this early equitable-
distribution case, the court refused to establish a presumptive division of marital
assets on a 50-50 basis, see id. at 503 n.6, many courts today do presume an equal
division, and many recently enacted statutes expressly so provide, see J. GREGORY,
THE LAW OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 8.03 (1989).
103 In 1989, Professor Oldham reported that "Mississippi is the only state that
has not clearly accepted [the equitable-distribution] system." J. Thomas Oldham,
Tracing Commingling and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219, 219 n.1 (1989) (citing
Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1988)).
For a fascinating account of how this system swept the country, see Mary A.
Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, in THE
CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 245 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds., 1981).
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tions of a nonworking spouse or homemaker to the
acquisition of that property. Simply stated, the system of
equitable distribution views marriage as essentially a
shared enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a
partnership to which both spouses contribute-directly and
indirectly, financially and nonfinancially-the fruits of
which are distributable at divorce.104
The common-law states also protect spousal property rights
when the decedent disinherits the surviving spouse. The overwhelm-
ing majority of common-law states have responded to this situation
by curtailing the decedent's testamentary power over title-based
ownership interests. Regardless of the decedent's intent, the
surviving spouse receives a partial claim to the.decedent's estate-a
forced share. Because title to the decedent's property does not
automatically transfer to the surviving spouse upon the decedent's
death, the forced share must be elected. Thus, the UPC uses the
more descriptive term "elective" share.
Elective-share law in the common-law states has not caught up
to the partnership theory of marriage. Under conventional elective-
share law, including the pre-1990 UPC elective-share provision, the
surviving spouse is granted a right to claim a one-third share of the
decedent's estatelOs In comparison, the marital-partnership theory
would allow a claim for one-half of the couple's combined assets.
The 1990 UPC elective-share provision is designed to bring elective-
share law into line with the partnership theory of marriage.'06
To illustrate the discrepancy between the partnership theory
and conventional elective-share law, consider first a long-term
marriage in which the couple's combined assets were mostly
accumulated during the course of the marriage. The conventional
elective share of one-third of the decedent's estate plainly does not
104 GREGORY, supra note 102, 1.03, at 1-6.
105 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(a), 8 U.L.A. 74 (1983) (amended 1990).
'0 Id., 8 U.LA. 88-89 (Supp. 1992).
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implement a partnership principle.1 7 The actual result is governed
by which spouse happens to die first and by how the marital property
was nominally titled.
Consider Ben and Elaine again. Assume that they married in
their twenties, never divorced, and Ben died at age sixty-two, survived
by Elaine. For whatever reason, Ben left a will entirely disinheriting
Elaine. The couple accumulated assets worth $600,000 during their
marriage.
Because conventional elective-share law grants Elaine a claim to
one-third of Ben's estate, her ultimate entitlement is governed by the
manner in which the marital assets were nominally titled. She could
receive much more or much less than the fifty percent share that the
partnership principle would imply.
In a marriage in which the marital assets were disproportion-
ately titled in the decedent's name, conventional elective-share law
often entitles the survivor to less than an equal share. Thus, if Ben
"owned' all $600,000 of the marital assets, Elaine's claim against
Ben's estate would only be for $200,000-well below the $300,000
amount the marital-partnership theory produces. If Ben "owned"
$500,000 of the marital assets, Elaine's claim against Ben's estate
would only be for $166,500 (one-third of $500,000), which when
combined with Elaine's "own" $100,000 yields a less than equal share
of $266,500--still below the $300,000 figure produced by the marital-
partnership theory.
107 Nor does a less conventional elective-share fraction of one-half of the
decedent's estate, which a few states have adopted, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-
11-201 (1987), implement true partnership principles. A one-half share of the
decedent's assets whenever or however acquired does not equal a one-half share of
the couple's assets acquired during the marriage other than by gift or inheritance.
For example, if the marital assets were equally titled, a one-half share of the
decedent's estate allows the survivor to take 75% of the couple's assets. Worse yet,
if the marital assets were disproportionately titled in the survivor's name, the survivor
takes an even greater percentage of the marital assets. For example, if 80% of the
marital assets were titled in the survivor's name and 20% in the decedent's name, the
survivor takes 90% of the marital assets.
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In a marriage in which the marital assets were more or less
equally divided, conventional elective-share law grants the survivor a
right to take a disproportionately large share. If Ben and Elaine
each owned $300,000, Elaine is still granted a claim against Ben's
estate for an additional $100,000.
Finally, in a marriage in which the marital assets were dispro-
portionately titled in the survivor's name, conventional elective-share
law entitles the survivor to magnify the disproportion. If Ben owned
$200,000 of the marital assets, Elaine would still have a claim against
Ben's estate for $66,667 (one-third of $200,000), even though Elaine
was already overcompensated as measured by the partnership theory.
I should now like to draw attention to a very different sort of
marriage-a short-term marriage, particularly the short-term
marriage later in life, in which each spouse typically enters the
marriage with assets derived from a former marriage. In these
marriages, the conventional one-third share of the decedent's estate
greatly exceeds a fifty-fifty division of assets acquired during the
marriage.
The point is illustrated by the hypothetical case of Elaine and
Carl. Recall that, a few years after Ben's death, Elaine married Carl.
Suppose that both Elaine and Carl were in their mid-to-later sixties
when they married. Then suppose that after a few years of mar-
riage-five, let us say-Elaine died survived by Carl. Suppose
further that both Elaine and Carl have adult children and a few
grandchildren by their prior marriages, and that each naturally would
prefer to leave most or all of his or her property to those children.
As before, the value of the couple's combined assets is
$600,000, $300,000 of which is titled in Elaine's name and $300,000
of which is titled in Carl's name. Under conventional elective-share
law, Carl has a claim to one-third of Elaine's estate, or $100,000. For
reasons that are not immediately apparent, conventional elective-
share law gives Carl, the survivor, a right to shrink Elaine's estate
(and hence the share of Elaine's children from her prior marriage to
Ben) by $100,000, reducing it to $200,000, while supplementing Carl's
assets (which will likely go to Carl's children by his prior marriage) by
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$100,000, increasing their value to $400,000. Conventional elective-
share law, in other words, basically rewards the children of the
remarried spouse who manages to outlive the other, arranging for
those children a windfall share of one-third of the "loser's" estate.
The "winning" spouse-the one who chanced to survive-gains a
windfall, for the "winner" is unlikely to have made a contribution,
monetary or otherwise, to the "loser's" wealth remotely worth one-
third.
How prevalent are marriages like that between Elaine and
Carl-the remarriage later in life ending in the death of one of the
partners a few years later? Plainly, such marriages do not affect a
high proportion of the widowed and divorced population. Neverthe-
less, government data suggest that the incidence of such marriages
may not be insignificant.l°
10 Data published by the federal government reveal that, within the widowed
and divorced population at large, not disaggregated by age, about 21% of widowed
men and about 8% of widowed women remarry, and about 83% of divorced men
and 78% of divorced women remarry. REMARRIAGES AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES,
supra note 3, at 12. The average (mean) ages at the time of remarriage of widowed
men and women have steadily increased from 57.7 in 1970 to 60.2 in 1983 for men
and from 50.3 in 1970 to 52.6 in 1983 for women. Id. at 24 tbl. 4. The average
(mean) ages at remarriage of divorced men and women have also steadily increased,
but the ages are, of course, much lower. The average (mean) ages increased from
36.7 in 1970 to 37.3 in 1983 for men and increased from 32.8 in 1970 to 33.7 in 1983
for women. Id.
In 1983, the average intervals between becoming widowed and remarriage for
the 65-and-older age group were 3.6 years for men and 7.9 years for women. Id. at
13. The average intervals between divorce and remarriage for the same age group
were 6.3 years for men and 10.4 years for women. Id.
Within the 65-and-older population, 2.62% of divorced men and .05% of
divorced women remarried during 1983. Id. at 23 tbl. 3. In the same year, 1.68% of
widowed men age 65 and older and .02% of widowed women age 65 and older
remarried. Id Within the divorced population ages 60 to 64, 4.93% of divorced
men and 1.29% of divorced women remarried in 1983. Id Figures were not given
for the widowed population ages 60 to 64. The remarriage rates within the 65-and-
older divorced and widowed segments of the population have been trending
downward, but not in a straight line. The data show peaks and valleys during the
1970-83 period. One of the peaks occurred in 1975 when 3.14% of divorced men,
.09% of divorced women, 1.95% of widowed men, and .02% of widowed women
remarried. Id. 1975 data for the 60 to 64 years age group were not reported. Id.
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Equally relevant to the point is that, when such marriages occur,
conventional elective-share law produces results that are dramatically
inconsistent with the partnership theory of marriage. That the
children of the decedent's former marriage see these results as unjust
is both unsurprising and well documented in the elective-share case
law. 19 Recognize, then, that in a short-term, late-in-life marriage,
which produces no children, a decedent who disinherits or largely
disinherits the surviving spouse may not be acting out of malice or
spite toward the surviving spouse, but from a perceived higher
obligation to the children from his or her former, long-term marriage.
a. Specific Features of the Redesigned Elective Share
The 1990 UPC elective-share system responds to these concerns
by bringing elective-share law into line with the partnership theory of
marriage.
In the long-term marriage, illustrated by the marriage of Ben
and Elaine, the effect of implementing a partnership theory is to
increase the entitlement of the surviving spouse when the marital
assets were disproportionately titled in the decedent's name and to
decrease or eliminate the surviving spouse's entitlement when the
These remarriage rates do not reveal the remarriage rates of divorced or
widowed men and women age 65 and older or 60 to 64. They merely reveal the
remarriage rates for a given year. Because such remarriages accumulate within the
population, the incidence of remarriage later in life appears to be significant.
109 See W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 156-57 (1960) (Of
the reported elective share cases in which the author could identify the relationships,
more than half pitted children of a former marriage against a later spouse).
Statistics show:
On average, women ending first marriages had 1.06 children
under 18 years, those ending second marriages had .064
children, and those ending third marriages had .036 children.
These differences are due at least in part to the fact that
most children are born into first marriages and may not be
mentioned on divorce records of subsequent marriages unless
custody becomes an issue.
REMARRIAGES AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES, supra note 3, at 3.
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marital assets were disproportionately or equally titled in the
surviving spouse's name. Put differently, the effect is both to reward
the surviving spouse who sacrificed money-making opportunities in
order to contribute domestic services to the marital enterprise and to
deny an additional windfall to the surviving spouse in whose name
the fruits of a long-term marriage were mostly titled.
In the short-term, later-in-life marriage, illustrated by the
marriage of Elaine and Carl, the effect of implementing a partner-
ship theory is to decrease or eliminate the windfall entitlement of the
spouse who chanced to survive, for, in such a marriage, neither
spouse is likely to have contributed much, if anything, to the
acquisition of the other's wealth. The partnership theory denies a
windfall to the surviving spouse who contributed little to the
decedent's wealth and, ultimately, denies a windfall to the survivor's
children by a prior marriage at the expense of the decedent's
children by a prior marriage. In hardship cases, however, the 1990
UPC grants the surviving spouse a special supplemental elective-
share amount when the surviving spouse would otherwise lack
sufficient funds for support. 110
b. Implementing the Partnership Theory of Marriage
Because ease of administration and predictability of result are
prized features of the probate system, implementing the partnership
theory proved to be a challenging undertaking. In the judgment of
the UPC drafters, neither model provided by existing law-the
equitable-distribution system of divorce law or the community-
property system for allocating ownership of marital property equally
between spouses-seemed appropriate as a basis for adapting forced-
share law to noncommunity property states.
110 The supplemental elective-share provision, established by UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-201(b), 8 U.L.A. 89 (Supp. 1992), is discussed infa text accompanying
notes 153-61.
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(1) An Equitable-Distribution Elective Share?
Modeling the elective share on divorce law appeared to the
UPC drafters to be quite unsatisfactory. The strongest argument for
extending divorce law to disinheritance at death is that of parallelism.
Disinheritance of a spouse at death resembles divorce, the argument
goes, because the marriage has failed and terminated."' There are
several objections to this analogy. One is that disinheritance at
death, especially in the late-in-life marriage, does not always signify
a failed marriage. When the disinherited spouse has ample indepen-
dent means of support, a decedent might disinherit the spouse to
provide for children by a prior marriage. Conventional law allows
such a surkiving spouse to take an elective share of the decedent's
estate anyway, or to be prevailed upon by his or her children by a
prior marriage to do so.
Nor is the goal of parity between regimes of marital property
division at divorce and upon death compatible with a uniform laws
project striving to achieve uniformity within the probate system.
Although all or almost all states now follow the so-called equitable-
distribution system upon divorce, there is considerable variation
among the states in the details, large and small, of implementing that
system. There is not one, uniformly accepted equitable-distribution
system; there are several.1 2 The systems vary with respect to the
type of property that is subject to equitable distribution and they take
into account different factors in deciding how to divide that property.
One author has identified three major types of equitable-distribution
"I See, e.g., Marie Falsey, Comment, Spousal Disinheritance: The New York
Solution-A Critique of Forced Share Legislation, 7 W. NEW ENo. L. REV. 881, 905
(1985).
112 For a state-by-state compilation of the different systems, see LAWRENCE J.
GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY (1983 & Supp. 1990); J.
GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION (1989); G. MCLELLAN,
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE (1985); J. THOMAS OLDHAM,
DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY (1989).
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systems:113 (1) the "kitchen sink" system, in which all property of
the two spouses, regardless of how or when acquired, is subject to
division;114 (2) the "marital property" system, which excludes
"separate" or "individual" property-that is, property acquired by
either spouse before the marriage and property acquired by either
spouse during the marriage by gift or inheritance; and (3) the
"hybrid" system, in which separate or individual property is presump-
tively excluded from division, but could be reached when exclusion
would be "unfair." Further variations within each broad category are
recognized.
If parity between the regimes of marital property at divorce and
upon death is the goal, a uniform laws project that aspires to a single
regime for dissolution at death cannot track the multitude of regimes
on divorce. The logic of the argument for parity is that each state
should incorporate its equitable-distribution system into its elective-
share system. The logic of a uniform laws project dealing with
probate law is that all states should adopt the same elective-share
system, particularly in order to prevent a spouse bent on disinheri-
tance from domicile shopping by relocating property to a state with
fewer safeguards.
Quite apart from these concerns, the discretionary aspect of
equitable-distribution law makes it inappropriate for an elective-share
system. Under equitable distribution, once the property subject to
division is identified, the practice is not to divide that property by
applying a flat fraction, fifty-fifty or whatever, but to weigh various
factors in determining how that property is to be divided, often (but
not always) including "misconduct" or "fault" of each party-such as
113 OLDHAM, supra note 112, § 3.03; see also Joseph W. McKnight, Defining
Propeny Subject to Division at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 193 (1989) (suggesting that
effecting an equitable dissolution depends on how courts classify property).
114 But see OLDHAM, supra note 112, § 13.02(1][i] (noting judicial reluctance to
divide property acquired before the marriage or during the marriage by gift or
inheritance "unless the circumstances warrant").
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adultery, violence, excessive drinking, sexual neglect, mental
crueltyns-and other subjective criteria.1 1 6  When death termi-
nates the marriage, only the surviving spouse can testify regarding
certain types or instances of misconduct or fault, making consider-
ation of factors such as these seem unfair to the decedent's side. In
addition, whether or not the state's laundry list of factors includes
fault or misconduct, the exact weight to be given each factor is not pre-
scribed. Because each case is handled on an ad hoc basis, 1 7
115 See GREGORY, supra note 112, 9.03. In Brown v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 528
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986), for example, a husband demonstrated the wife's fault by
proffering evidence that his wife "talked to him like he was dirt, hurt his feelings,
made him nervous, refused at times to let him touch her, did little or no housekeep-
ing or cooking, didn't like visits from the neighbors, and was very extravagant with
his money." Id. at 529.
116 For a discussion of other factors, see GREGORY, supra note 112, ch. 8;
OLDHAM, supra note 112, §§ 13.02-.03. Professor McKnight reports that "as many as
thirty-eight factors have been identified that may be considered in equitable
distribution." McKnight, supra note 113, at 197 n.14 (citing Mary J. Connell, Note,
Property Division and Alimony Awards: A Survey of Statutory Limitation on Judicial
Discretion, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 439 n.170 (1981)).
117 One commentator has described the equitable-distribution process as follows:
Most equitable distribution statutes set out a list of factors that a
court must consider when distributing property. In a few jurisdictions
where the statutes do not contain factors, appellate courts have
developed and articulated them for the guidance of the trial courts. At
the same time, it is abundantly clear that no particular factors are
intended to be more important than any others. In the final analysis,
judicial discretion is the hallmark of equitable distribution.
A much debated point among lawyers, legislators, and others
engaged in drafting equitable distribution legislation is whether equal
division is most equitable. The question is far from resolved and
perhaps never will be. In a small minority of jurisdictions, the statutes
contain a presumption of equal division of marital property. In a few
others, the courts have created a fifty-fifty starting point for division,
even while rejecting a presumption of equal division. Some states
reject altogether both presumptions and starting points.
GREGORY, supra note 112, 8.01; see also OLDHAM, supra note 112, § 13.02[2]
(noting and lamenting the arbitrary results produced by giving trial courts such great
discretion).
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equitable distribution is in truth "discretionary distribution."""u The
following analysis of Professors Kwestel and Seplowitz sums up many
of the reasons for not carrying equitable-distribution law into the
elective share:
[An equitable distribution model, which entails a case-by-
case determination based upon ... subjective criteria, is
not appropriate in the elective share area, which has
traditionally involved different concerns and in which
predictability and ease of administration are important
goals. Furthermore, use of an equitable distribution
model would significantly impede the development of a
comprehensive estate plan and, more importantly, would
probably provide no greater protection for the surviving
spouse .... 119
118 Mary A. Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553,
1556 (1984).
This discretionary distribution system closely resembles the Testator's Family
Maintenance (TFM) system, which is prevalent in England and the Commonwealth.
TEM empowers a judge to vary the testator's will "to make reasonable financial
provision" for the surviving spouse. Inheritance Act (Provision for Family and Depen-
dents Act), 1975, ch. 63, § 1 (Eng.). In determining what is reasonable, the court can
consider the competing equities of the children of a prior marriage, the adequacy of
the spouse's own resources, the spouse's age, and "the duration of the marriage." Id.
§ 3(1)(a)-(b), (2)(a). TFM remits to judicial discretion every important policy issue
in forced-share law. For a lucid critique of TFM, see Mary A. Glendon, Fixed Rules
and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TuL L. REV.
1165, 1186-89 (1986).
The discretionary characteristic of equitable-distribution law contributes to the
high rate of private settlement in divorce cases, estimated to be about 90%. See AM.
L INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (Prelim. Draft No. 1, 1990); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.
950, 970 n.64 (1979).
119 Sidney Kwestel & Rena C. Seplowitz, Testamentary Substitutes-A ime for
Statutory Clarification, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 467, 472 n.22 (1988); see
Estate of Pejsa, 459 N.W.2d 243 (S.D. 1990) (demonstrating the discretionary and
unpredictable nature of South Dakota's equitable-distribution elective share).
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(2) A Deferred Community-Property Elective Share?
The other model from existing law that might have been used to
implement a marital-partnership theory is the community-property
system. As noted before, under community-property law, each
spouse automatically acquires a half interest in property as it is
acquired during the marriage (other than by gift or inheritance).
There are two possible approaches for injecting community law into
the legislative schemes of the noncommunity property states on a
deferred-until-death basis. Unfortunately, it is not always clear which
of the two approaches is advocated by those proposing it. 120 One
approach, which I call the strict deferred-community approach,
automatically retitles the couple's property upon the decedent's
death, giving both the surviving spouse and the decedent spouse's
estate an automatic half interest in that portion of the couple's
property (however titled during the course of the marriage) that
would have been community property had the couple spent their
married life in a community-property jurisdiction. 121 The other
approach, which I call the elective-share deferred-community
approach, gives the surviving spouse (but not the decedent spouse's
estate) a right to elect that same portion of the couple's proper-
120 See J. Thomas Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be
Retained?, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 223, 24547 (1987). In his article, the author
apparently advocates the elective-share deferred-community approach, but he does
not mention the strict deferred-community approach.
121 In an analogous situation, the community-property states of California and
Washington apply a strict deferred-community approach to "quasi-community"
property. The quasi-community property concept addresses the problem of
"migratory" married couples by treating as quasi-community property all property
acquired by the couple while living in a noncommunity property jurisdiction that
would have been community property had the couple been living in a community-
property jurisdiction when the property was acquired. In California and Washington,
quasi-community property is automatically retitled at death, hence invoking a strict
deferred-community approach. See CAi. PROB. CODE §§ 66, 101 (West Supp. 1991);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.220-.250 (West Supp. 1991).
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The elective-share deferred-community approach is considerably
more appealing as a model for implementing the marital-partnership
theory than equitable-distribution law.123 Interestingly, most of the
community-property states distinguish between termination of a
marriage by divorce and termination by death of one of the spouses:
The discretionary equitable-distribution system is used for di-
vorce,124 but the mechanical community-property fifty-fifty split is
used at death. In the probate area, the attractive feature of
community law is its predetermined formula. That portion of the
couple's property acquired during the marriage (other than by gift or
inheritance) is divided according to a strict fifty-fifty ratio; other
factors are excluded. In terms of the contribution theory, the
premise upon which community law can be said to rest is that of an
irrebuttable presumption that each spouse contributed equally to the
acquisition of the couple's wealth.123 The argument for a mechani-
122 The community-property states of Idaho and Wisconsin apply an elective-
share deferred-community approach to quasi-community property. These states
permit the surviving spouse to elect to take a half share of the couple's quasi-
community property, hence invoking an elective-share deferred-community approach.
See IDAHO CODE §§ 15-2-201 to -209 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 851.055, 861.02
(West 1991). For an explanation of quasi-community property, see supra note 121.
123 In comparing the strict and elective-share deferred-community approaches,
the strict approach is more consistent with the marital-partnership theory, but the
elective-share approach is more consistent with the notion of an elective share in the
common-law states. See infra note 147.
124 See OLDHAM, supra note 112, § 3.03[5] (In a few community property states,
community property must be divided equally. [citing CAL CV. CODE § 4800 (West
1983)]. Most of these states, however, permit an equitable division of the community
estate. [citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.180
(1987); TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.63 (1975)]."); see also William A. Reppy, Jr., Major
Events in the Evolution of American Community Property Law and Their Import to
Equitable Distribution States, 23 FAM. L.Q. 163, 164 (1989).
125 Stated in marital-partnership terms, the law presumes that the couple
impliedly bargained to split in half the marital proceeds, unless the couple provided
otherwise in a premarital or postmarital agreement.
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cal, as opposed to a discretionary, formula for determining contribu-
tion was recently stated in these terms:
[Elective-share] law could, in theory, open [the question of
contribution] to examination on the merits in each case,
but it has not, and for good reason. The proofs would be
extraordinarily difficult. The issues in such a case would
not resemble the issues in ordinary fact-finding-issues
such as whether the traffic light was green or red.
Examining the true merits of the case under [an elective-
share] system that tried to establish the spouses' actual
contributions to the family wealth would necessarily entail
an inquiry into virtually every facet of the spouses' conduct
throughout the marriage. Further, that litigation would
arise just when death has sealed the lips of the most
affected party. These are the concerns that have in the
past led American policymakers to prefer a mechanical
[elective-share] system over [a discretionary] system. 126
Like equitable-distribution systems, community-property systems
also vary from state to state regarding some of the details. Some
states, for example, treat income earned during the marriage on
separate property as community property; other states treat it as
separate. But these variations do not pose a parity problem because
no one would propose an elective share based on a deferred-until-
death community-property model for adoption in community-
property states. If a deferred community-property elective share
were to be proposed, it would be for adoption in the noncommunity-
property states. Consequently, the variations in the details of
community law that exist among the community-property states could
easily be resolved by embracing one method regarding each of the
subsidiary issues upon which there is variation.127
126 John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's
Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 320-21 (1987).
127 Had we decided to adopt a deferred-community elective share, subsidiary
questions (such as whether income generated by and appreciation in value of
separate property during the marriage are marital or separate property) would have
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If lack of parity is not a problem, why then did the UPC
drafters not adopt a deferred-community elective share? The
perceived drawback was the tracing-to-source and other problems
associated with classification. 128  A deferred-community elective
share would require identifying which of the couple's assets were
acquired during the marriage (other than by gift or inheritance) and
which were brought into the marriage (or acquired during the
marriage by gift or inheritance). The classification problem is
arguably more difficult in noncommunity-property states than in
community-property states because couples in the former states are
not put on notice regarding the risk of not maintaining good records.
The problem is commingling. 129
To be sure, the administrative burden could be eased by
adopting a rebuttable presumption that all spousal property is
community property. That presumption would ease the administra-
tive burden, but at the cost of reaching incorrect results in cases in
which the presumption would prevail, not because it is correct, but
been resolved pursuant to the Uniform Marital Property Act. For a discussion of
these issues under the various community and equitable-distribution regimes, see
Mary M. Wenig, The Increase in Value of Separate Property During Marriage:
Examination and Proposals, 23 FAm. LQ. 301 (1989).
128 For a discussion of tracing-to-source and associated classification problems
in equitable-distribution law, see Popp v. Popp, 432 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988); John F. Kessler, Transmutation, Wis. LAW., Aug. 1990, at 13; Oldham, supra
note 103.
129 See GLENDON, supra note 60, at 124 (stating that even title-based systems are
"not always simple in practical application.... Complexity creeps in because in most
households the assets of the spouses tend to be mingled rather than kept separate
or neatly earmarked."); see also Popp, 432 N.W.2d at 600; Kessler, supra note 128;
Oldham, supra note 103.
Jane Bryant Quinn, the columnist, has written that married couples divide into
two categories-"poolers" and "splitters." Poolers put all their earnings into a single,
marital account; savings, investments, and the house are held jointly; even
inheritances tend to straggle toward the common pot. Splitters keep their money
separate. The longer splitters are married, the more they edge towards forms of
pooling. Jane B. Quinn, Maniage and Money--Keeping the Peace, WoMAN's DAY,
June 16, 1987, at 18.
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because sufficient contrary evidence cannot be obtained3o Thus,
what appears to be an exact method may not in fact give exact
results.
c. The Method Adopted-An Accrual-Type Elective-
Share System
Given the inescapable problems associated with classification,
the UPC drafters decided to implement the marital-partnership
theory by means of a mechanically determined approximation system,
which the drafters call an accrual-type elective share.131 Under this
system, property earned during the marriage need not be segregated
from property acquired prior to the marriage or acquired during the
marriage by gift or inheritance.
The 1990 UPC's accrual-type elective share has three essential
features. 32  First, section 2-201(a) establishes a schedule under
which the elective-share percentage adjusts to the length of the mar-
riage. 33  The longer the marriage, the larger the elective-share
130 See Robert J. Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q.
147, 152-53 (1989) (noting that, in the equitable-distribution context "the stronger the
presumption [in favor of characterizing all property as marital property], the less
likely it will be that the spouse who owned nonmarital property at marriage or
received some during the marriage will try to trace the property or funds" and that
the weaker the presumption, the more likely it will be that tracing issues will be
litigated).
131 For a proposal that divorce law should utilize an accrual-type system for
asset division, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing the Financial Interests on Divorce,
in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 159-60 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma H. Kay eds., 1990).
132 The 1990 UPC's accrual-type elective share has been endorsed by the
Assembly of the National Association of Women Lawyers, on the unanimous
recommendation of its Executive Board. Letter from Gail M. Beckman, President,
National Association of Women Lawyers, to the author (August 14, 1990) (on file
with author).
133 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(a), 8 U.L.A. 88-89 (Supp. 1992).
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percentage. This sliding scale is intended to approximate the corre-
spondingly greater contribution to the acquisition of the couple's
marital property in a marriage of fifteen years than in a marriage of
fifteen days. Specifically, the elective-share percentage is initially
small and increases annually according to a graduated schedule until
it reaches a maximum rate of 50%.13 During the first year of
marriage, the schedule provides the surviving spouse a right to elect
the supplemental elective-share amount only.13 After five years of
marriage, the elective-share percentage is 15% of the augmented
estate; after ten years of marriage, the share is 30%; and after fifteen
years of marriage, the share reaches the maximum 50% level.136
The second feature of the 1990 UPC elective-share system is
that the elective-share percentage is applied to the "augmented
estate," which includes the value of the couple's combined assets and
not merely the value of the assets nominally titled in the decedent's
name. 137 Specifically, the augmented estate consists of the sum of
the values of four components. 138 On the decedent's side are
(1) the decedent's net probate estate and (2) the decedent's reclaim-
134 I&
135 Id. § 2-201 (a)-(b). The supplemental elective-share amount is explained infra
text accompanying notes 153-61.
136 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(a), 8 U.L.A. 88-89 (Supp. 1992). Unlike
Elaine and Carl's short-term marriage, some later-in-life marriages will endure for 15
or more years, which will entitle the surviving spouse to a 50% elective share. Some
will endure for almost 15 years, which will entitle the surviving spouse to a near-50%
elective share.
As previously noted, the average (mean) age at remarriage is 60.2 for widowed
men and 52.6 for widowed women. See supra note 108. The 1988 government data
report that average life expectancy at birth for men is 71.5 and that average life
expectancy at birth for women is 78.3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES-1991, at 73 tbl. 105
(111th ed. 1991). These figures indicate that many spouses in later-in-life marriages
will endure 15 years and reach the maximum 50% elective-share percentage.
137 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201(a), -202(b), 8 U.L.A. 88-91 (Supp. 1992).
'
3
' Id § 2-202(b)(1)-(4), 8 U.L.A. 90-91.
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able estate.1 39 On the surviving spouse's side are (3) the property
to which the surviving spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's
death other than from the decedent's probate estate'40 and (4) the
property owned by the surviving spouse plus amounts that would
have been included in the surviving spouse's reclaimable estate had
the spouse predeceased the decedent. The application of the
elective-share percentage to the augmented estate yields the elective-
share amount-the amount to which the surviving spouse is enti-
tled. 141 Including the couple's combined assets in the augmented
estate is absolutely essential to implement a marital-partnership
theory. If the elective-share percentage were to be applied only to
the decedent's assets, the elective-share system would grant a windfall
to a surviving spouse who held nominal title to half or more of the
couple's marital assets.142  The couple's marital assets, in other
words, would not be equalized. By applying the elective-share
percentage to the couple's combined assets, the 1990 UPC elective-
share system disregards the possibly fortuitous factor of how the
couple took title to particular assets.
The third feature relates to the means of satisfying the elective-
share amount: The surviving spouse's own assets (or a portion of
them in under fifteen-year marriages, as explained below) are applied
first.1 43 The decedent's assets are liable only to the extent of any
deficiency.
139 For a discussion of the reclaimable-estate provision's role in preventing
"fraud on the spouse's share," see infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
140 This component includes life insurance on the decedent's life payable to the
surviving spouse and property held by the decedent and surviving spouse in joint
tenancy. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(b)(3), 8 U.LA. 91 (Supp. 1992).
141 Id. § 2-201 (a), 8 U.L.A. 88-89.
142 The windfall occurs even if the elective share is one-half instead of the
traditional one-third. See supra note 107.
143 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-207, 8 U.L.A. 99 (Supp. 1992).
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To illustrate these three features, we can reexamine the cases of
Ben and Elaine and Elaine and Carl. Remember that Ben and
Elaine were married a long time, well beyond fifteen years, and that
Ben died at age sixty-two, survived by Elaine. Remember also that,
for whatever reason, Ben left a will entirely disinheriting Elaine'"
and that the couple's combined assets totalled $600,000.145
Under the 1990 UPC, Elaine's elective-share percentage would
have reached the maximum 50% rate long before Ben's death.
Unlike previous elective-share statutes, the 1990 UPC disregards how
these combined assets were nominally titled. The 1990 UPC does
not view the marital assets as partly belonging to Ben and partly to
Elaine. Under the 1990 UPC's marital-partnership theory, half the
value of those assets "belongs" to Elaine if she chooses to claim that
amount by making an election.
Of course, in calculating the amount of Elaine's claim on Ben's
estate, it does matter how the $600,000 in assets was nominally titled.
If the marital assets were disproportionately titled in the decedent's
name, the 1990 UPC gives the surviving spouse a right to equalize
them.' If Ben "owned" all $600,000 of the marital assets, Elaine's
claim against Ben's estate would be for $300,000. If Ben "owned"
$500,000 of the marital assets and Elaine "owned" $100,000, Elaine's
claim against Ben's estate would be for $200,000, which is the
amount necessary to bring Elaine's $100,000 in assets up to $300,000.
In marriages in which the marital assets were nearly equally
titled, the 1990 UPC elective-share system prevents the survivor from
144 This example assumes that Ben entirely disinherited Elaine, that is, that
nothing passed to Elaine by testate or intestate succession, by nonprobate transfers
such as life insurance, or by right of survivorship under a joint tenancy or a joint
bank account. If property passed to Elaine by any of these methods, § 2-207(a)(1)
provides that these assets count first toward satisfying Elaine's elective-share amount.
Id § 2-207(a)(1).
145 Note that under the 1990 UPC's augmented-estate system, the couple's
combined assets extend well beyond the so-called probate assets and include such
items as the couple's home (even if held in joint tenancy), life insurance, and pension
benefits. Id § 2-202(b), 8 U.LA. 90-91.
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taking a disproportionately large share. Thus, if $300,000 of the
marital assets were titled in Ben's name and $300,000 in Elaine's
name, Elaine would have no claim against Ben's estate. Elaine's
title-based ownership rights would already have sufficiently rewarded
her, as measured by the partnership theory.
In marriages in which the marital assets were disproportionately
titled in the survivor's name, the 1990 UPC elective-share system
prevents the survivor from increasing the disparity. If Ben "owned"
$200,000 and Elaine "owned" $400,000, Elaine would have no
additional claim against Ben's estate.146
146 Elaine would have no claim against Ben's estate because she has already
been disproportionately compensated according to marital-partnership principles.
Under conventional elective-share law, Elaine could magnify the disproportion by
claiming an additional $66,667.
The 1990 UPC system does not equalize the distribution of marital assets by
giving Ben's estate a claim to a portion of Elaine's property, because such a claim
would contravene the purpose of an elective-share system. Noncommunity-property
states traditionally view the elective share as personally benefitting the surviving
spouse rather than the beneficiaries of a spouse's estate. For this reason, the 1990
UPC elective-share system does not recognize the decedent spouse's marital-
partnership interest. For similar reasons, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,
UNiF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH AcT, 8A U.L.A. 315 (Supp. 1992), and the
corresponding UPC version, UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104, -702, 8 U.L.A. 75,138-
40 (Supp. 1992), which imposes a 120-hour survivorship requirement in simultaneous
or near-simultaneous death cases, do not invoke a marital-partnership theory; instead
they distribute each spouse's property to that spouse's beneficiaries.
The community property system differs from the 1990 UPC elective-share
system. The community-property system protects the decedent's interest as well as
the survivor's interest. Achieving parity in noncommunity elective-share law would
require granting the deceased spouse's estate a claim against the surviving spouse's
assets. This claim would devolve upon the decedent's personal representative in the
same manner that a fiduciary makes the election on behalf of an incapacitated
surviving spouse.
Administratively, there are at least two ways for handling this situation. One
is to authorize the decedent spouse's personal representative to make the election.
Because the decedent spouse's personal representative owes a fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries of the decedent's estate, the election would be virtually automatic unless
waived by a well-drafted instrument. This contrasts with the present situation in
which the elective share is exercised only rarely, in cases of deliberate disinheritance
of the survivor. The other way of handling the situation is to authorize the decedent
spouse's personal representative to make the election only if the decedent spouse's
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Now, let us return to Elaine and Carl. Remember that, a few
years after Ben's death, Elaine married Carl. Both Elaine and Carl
were in their mid-to-late sixties. After five years of marriage, Elaine
died, survived by Carl. Elaine and Carl each had adult children and
grandchildren from their prior marriages.
The previous discussion of this example showed how the
conventional-type elective-share law allows the surviving spouse to
siphon off (for the survivor's children, eventually) a share of the
decedent's estate without justification under the marital-sharing
principle. Let us now see how Carl, and ultimately his children by his
prior marriage, fare under the UPC elective-share system. Recall
that the value of the couple's combined assets was $600,000, of which
$300,000 was titled in Elaine's name (the decedent) and $300,000 was
titled in Carl's name (the survivor). Because the marriage lasted
about five years, the applicable elective-share percentage is 15%.
Although Carl's elective-share amount is $90,000 (15% of
$600,000), Carl does not necessarily have a $90,000 claim against
Elaine's estate. In a short-term marriage such as this, a portion of
Carl's own assets is applied first in satisfying his elective-share
amount. The portion of Carl's assets that counts first is 30%, a
figure determined by doubling the elective-share percentage. 147
will or some other legal document authorizes or directs the election. This approach
is less objectionable than the first because it would reduce the number of elections.
But even this approach would require that the cumbersome elective-share apparatus
apply not only to cases in which the less wealthy spouse predeceases the other by a
clear or substantial margin, but also to simultaneous and near-simultaneous death
cases. Moreover, this approach contravenes the traditional notion that the elective
share personally benefits the surviving spouse. Thus the 1990 UPC leaves the parties
where they are in this situation, and provides neither with a claim against the other's
assets.
147 Under § 2-207(a)(4) of the 1990 UPC, the portion of the surviving spouse's
assets that counts toward satisfying the elective-share amount is derived by applying
a percentage to the survivor's assets equal to twice the elective-share percentage.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-207(a)(4), 8 U.L.A. 99 (Supp. 1992). As applied to Carl,
30% of his assets (twice the 15% elective-share percentage) would count toward
satisfying the elective-share amount.
Why is it appropriate to double the elective-share percentage in determining
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Because 30% of Carl's assets is $90,000, no deficiency exists and Carl
has no claim against Elaine's estate.
The 1990 UPC's accrual-type elective share is designed to
approximate results that would be reached under the partnership
theory of marriage. The theory of the system can be explained by
again comparing it to community-property law. Under community
law, each spouse gains an immediate right to 50% of the couple's
assets acquired from the first moment of the marriage, other than by
gift or inheritance. The hitch, of course, is that in the first moments
of the marriage, little or no such property exists. Growth of each
spouse's entitlement occurs over time as the marriage continues and
property is acquired and accumulated; each spouse's 50% share is
applied to an ever-growing aggregation of assets.
The 1990 UPC elective-share system operates the other way
how much of the survivor's assets count toward satisfying the elective-share amount?
In order to avoid the tracing-to-source problem, the 1990 UPC applies a graduated
elective-share percentage to the couple's combined assets without regard to when or
how the couple acquired those assets. The system equates the elective-share
percentage of the couple's combined assets with 50% of the couple's marital-
assets-assets subject to equalization under the marital-partnership theory. Thus, in
a marriage that endures long enough for the elective-share percentage to reach 15%,
the 1990 UPC system equates 15% of the couple's combined assets with 50% of all
assets acquired during the marriage, other than by gift or inheritance. In the
aggregate, the system considers 30% ($180,000) of the couple's $600,000 in combined
assets as assets acquired during the marriage other than by gift or inheritance.
The system applies the same ratio to each spouse's mix of assets as it does to the
couple's combined assets. For example, if the elective-share percentage is 15%, then
the combined assets are deemed to be held in a 30-70 ratio (30% marital, subject to
equalization; 70% individual, exempted from equalization). This ratio is also applied
to each spouse's mix of marital and individual property. Accordingly, the system
attributes 30% of Elaine's $300,000 ($90,000) to marital property and 70%
($210,000) to individual property. Correspondingly, 30% of Carl's $300,000 ($90,000)
is attributed to marital property and 70% ($210,000) to individual property.
Therefore, under the system's theory, Carl already owns $90,000 of the $180,000
of marital property. In elective-share terminology, $90,000 of Carl's $90,000 elective-
share entitlement comes from his own assets, giving him no right to any of Elaine's
net probate estate. Remember that $90,000 of Elaine's assets is attributed to marital
property; therefore, each spouse already owns his or her 50% marital-property share
of the combined assets.
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around. It does not distinguish between property acquired during the
marriage and other property, but compensates for this by applying an
ever-growing elective-share percentage to the couple's combined
assets regardless of when or how those assets were acquired. Thus,
the accrual schedule translates into a system that approximates the
ratio of marital to separate property in marriages of various lengths.
After five years of marriage, for example, each spouse's elective-
share percentage of 15% is meant to represent 50% of the couple's
marital-assets portion of the couple's property. In other words, the
law treats 30% of their combined assets as assets acquired during the
marriage. After ten years of marriage, the 30% elective-share
percentage treats 60% of the couple's combined assets as assets
acquired during the marriage. After fifteen years of marriage, the
50% elective-share percentage treats all of the assets as acquired
during the marriage.
How accurate is this approximation system? Overall, we believe
it to be reasonably accurate. In a given case, of course, the system
can be quite inaccurate. 14 It is rather easy, in fact, to pose cases
of gross inaccuracy-the decedent or the surviving spouse who
receives a large inheritance from a wealthy uncle the day before the
decedent's death149 or the surviving spouse who receives a large
inheritance from a wealthy aunt the day after the decedent's death.
These situations, however, rarely occur 50 and should not be used
148 For a discussion of how the system applies to marriages of young people that
end in the premature death of one of the spouses, see inf0 text accompanying notes
158-61.
149 The 1990 UPC system does not exempt inherited or separate property from
the augmented estate, even if the property is segregated and can be easily identified.
This might seem unfair, but in actuality it would be unfair to do the opposite. To
allow segregated inherited or separate property to be exempted from the system
would unfairly disadvantage the spouse whose inherited or separate property was not
segregated and could not be easily identified.
150 A bizarre turn of events can also distort community-property and equitable-
distribution law. In Lynch v. Lynch, 791 P.2d 653 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), a paper-
work error delayed a couple's final divorce decree beyond the date on which the
husband and wife won $2.2 million in the state lottery. Each spouse owned one-half
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to criticize a system that produces reasonably accurate results under
normal circumstances. Although wealth in any individual case will
not often accumulate in the linear fashion set forth in the accrual
schedule, that schedule is likely to be reasonably close to the mark in
most cases. The fact that it will probably never be exactly on the
mark in any given case should not be a reason to reject the system.
It should certainly not be a reason for perpetuating the conventional
elective-share systems now in place. Measured against the partner-
ship theory of marriage, conventional elective-share systems produce
grossly inaccurate results in nearly every case. Moreover, the other
partnership models-the equitable-distribution and deferred-
community property models-would suffer from far greater defects
and could produce an elective share that would be just as inaccurate
or more so in given cases. An equitable-distribution elective share
would be highly discretionary and unpredictable in result. A
deferred-community elective share would not only suffer from the
problem of tracing to source, but would still produce inaccurate
results when insufficient evidence exists to rebut the presumption that
all the couple's property is community property.'
2. Support Theory
The marital-partnership theory is not the only force driving
elective-share law. Another rationale is that the spouses' mutual
duties of support during their joint lifetimes should be continued in
some form after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the
decedent's estate. Conventional elective-share law implements this
theory poorly. The fixed fraction, whether the typical one-third or
some other fraction, disregards the survivor's actual needs. A one-
third share may be inadequate to the surviving spouse's needs,
of the winning ticket. The wife filed an amended petition in the unconcluded divorce
proceeding seeking half of the husband's winnings. ld at 655. The trial court
concluded that the husband's share of the winnings was community property and that
the wife was therefore entitled to half of his $1.1 million share. Id The Arizona
Court of Appeals affirmed. Id at 659.
1 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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especially in a modest estate. In a large estate, it may exceed the
survivor's needs. Moreover, conventional elective-share law
disregards the surviving spouse's independent sources of support.
The 1990 UPC elective-share system seeks to implement the
support theory by granting the survivor a supplemental elective-share
amount related to the survivor's actual needs.1 12 In implementing
a support rationale, the length of the marriage is quite irrelevant.
Because the duty of support is founded upon status, it arises at the
time of the marriage.
The 1990 UPC elective-share system implements the support
theory by providing a supplemental elective-share amount of
$50,000.153 Counted first in making up the $50,000 amount are the
surviving spouse's own title-based ownership interests, including
amounts shifting to the survivor at the decedent's death and amounts
owing to the survivor from the decedent's estate under the accrual-
type elective-share apparatus previously discussed.15 4 The system,
however, excludes amounts going to the surviving spouse under the
UPC probate exemptions and allowances and the survivor's social
security and other governmental benefits. Under 1990 UPC section
2-207, if the value of the surviving spouse's assets is below $50,000,
152 This support feature responds to the objection that the marital-partnership
theory, as applied to divorce law, provides insufficient funds to certain categories of
divorced women. See LENORE J. WEITZA4AN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN
IN AMERICA ch. 7 (1985); Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the
Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191,
201-04 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990); Bea A. Smith, The
Pannership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689
(1990). For criticism of the Weitzman study, see Sugarman, supra note 131, at 130.
153 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(b), 8 U.L.A. 89 (Supp. 1992). For a similar
proposal, see Richard L. Dees, Note, A Response to Johnson v. La Grange State
Bank: Restoring Forced Share Protection for the Surviving Spouse, 1980 U. ILL L.F.
277, 311 (including a proposal granting a minimum elective right of $50,000).
154 See discussion supra part II.C.I.c.
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the system holds the decedent's estate liable for the deficiency."' 5
In a later-in-life marriage, in which the surviving spouse could
easily be in the mid-seventies, the supplemental elective-share
amount plus the probate exemptions and allowances, social security
payments, 116 and other governmental benefits may provide the
survivor with a fairly adequate means of support.5 7 In short, the
155 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-207(b)-(c), 8 U.L.A. 99 (Supp. 1992).
156 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
157 If there could be any complaint about this feature of the UPC system, it
would be that the $50,000 figure is too low. With average social security payments
added in, $50,000 at current interest rates will generate an income stream of only
$723 a month ($8,676 a year), which is only $200 a month above the poverty level.
Although the spouse also receives the probate exemptions and allowances, which
typically would amount to an additional $43,000, a substantial portion of these
exemptions and allowances is made up of assets distributed in kind that are illiquid
and, unless sold, are not income-producing. By putting the $50,000 figure in
brackets, the 1990 UPC invites states to supply a different figure if they so choose.
A somewhat higher figure might be quite appropriate.
If the surviving spouse is incapacitated, § 2-203(b) of the 1990 UPC establishes
a special provision for the management and ultimate disposition of the elective-share
amount and the supplemental elective-share amount. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
203(b), 8 U.LA. 94 (Supp. 1992). These amounts, to the extent payable from the
decedent's probate or reclaimable estates, must be placed into a custodial or support
trust for the surviving spouse. Id. Enacting states are given a choice whether to
authorize the trustee of this trust to take governmental benefits such as Medicaid
into account in expending the assets of this trust for the spouse's support. Id § 2-
203(c)(2).
For a discussion of whether conventional elective-share law permits an insolvent
or Medicaid-assisted surviving spouse, incapacitated or not, to forgo an elective share
to defeat creditors or to qualify for Medicaid assistance, see Adam J. Hirsch, The
Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 587, 640-45 (1989); see also State
v. Jakubowski, CONN. L. TR]B., July 30,1990, at 31 (Conn. Super. Ct., June 13, 1990)
(holding that the state assistance agency had the right to appeal probate decree of
distribution when the surviving spouse's conservator failed to elect to take her
statutory share); Estate of Schoolnik, CONN. L TRIB., Dec. 4, 1989, at 28 (Conn.
Prob. Ct., Oct. 27, 1989) (requiring a Medicaid-assisted surviving spouse to elect to
take her statutory share); Flynn v. Bates, 413 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979) (holding that an application for medical assistance under state social services
law was properly denied because the test for eligibility "is the availability of assets
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supplemental elective-share amount prevents a wealthy decedent
from impoverishing the surviving spouse regardless of how brief or
extended, happy or unhappy the marriage.
Although the primary rationale for the supplemental elective-
share provision was to implement a support theory, the provision was
also designed to apply to short-term marriages of couples that end
when a young spouse dies. In early marriages, the partners typically
enter the marriage with little separate property. All or most of the
couple's wealth is accumulated during the marriage. Under a
community-property system, all or nearly all of their property would
be community property, and thus divided evenly between them. If
the marriage terminates upon a young spouse's death, the survivor
would be entitled to the community half despite the short duration of
the marriage. By contrast, under the 1990 UPC accrual-type elective
share, the short duration of the marriage would cause the elective-
share percentage to fall well short of the maximum 50%. Thus the
surviving spouse would receive an inadequate return of contribution.
This problem with accrual-type systems looms far greater for divorce
law than elective-share law, however, because early marriages that
are faltering tend to end by divorce rather than the premature death
of a spouse. To implicate elective-share law, the following must
occur:. (1) One spouse in an unhappy marriage must die very
prematurely, (2) the marital assets must be disproportionately titled
in the decedent's name, and (3) the decedent must have disinherited
the surviving spouse in a will executed during the marriage.
Although empirical evidence regarding the frequency of this
combination of events does not exist, data does establish that an
insignificant portion of the population dies in the early years of a
rather than those assets actually possessed' and the applicant's right to elect a sum
in excess of $26,000 against her deceased husband's will, which she had waived, was
an asset that was available to her). My thanks to David L Hemond, Chief Attorney
of the Connecticut Law Revision Commission, for bringing the Jakubowsld case to my
attention and Professor Mary Moers Wenig for bringing the Schoolnik case to my
attention.
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typical first marriage.1 58 Moreover, the majority of young persons
who die prematurely die intestate,15 9 in which case the 1990 UPC
gives the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate.16  If the
decedent left a will, it probably is a premarital will or a will that
devises most of the decedent's property to the surviving spouse. If it
is a premarital will, the 1990 UPC omitted-spouse provision
guarantees the surviving spouse an amount equal to an intestate
share of the decedent's estate, which in this type of marriage would
probably be the entire intestate estate.1
61
The bottom line is that instances of remarkably premature
death of a young married person who during marriage executed a will
that disinherits the surviving spouse are rare indeed. But, even in
these rare situations, the supplemental elective-share provision
guarantees the surviving spouse no less than $50,000 plus the probate
exemptions and allowances, which could amount to $93,000 in total.
Because most young decedents' estates are small, the supplemental
elective-share provision amply rewards the overwhelming majority of
surviving spouses who are both young and disinherited in a marriage
in which the marital assets were disproportionately titled in the
decedent's name.
158 Only about 0.5% of the population (married and unmarried) die between
ages 20 and 25, another 0.6% die between ages 25 and 30, and another 0.5% die
between ages 30 and 35. Indeed, only another 0.7% die between ages 35 and 40.
See 1 Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (CCH) 6415.301, tbl. 8OCNSMT, at 6961 (1989).
The probability of a surviving spouse's disinheritance in these age categories is even
lower than these low percentages suggest. Many of the persons dying in each age
category were probably unmarried.
159 According to the most comprehensive empirical study undertaken to date,
88% of Americans (married and unmarried) between ages 17 and 30 have no will,
and were they to die would die intestate; over 65% of those between ages 31 and 45
have no will, and would die intestate. See Fellows, supra note 58, at 336-39.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 49-95.
161 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301, 8 U.LA. 100 (Supp. 1992).
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3. Reclaimable-Estate Component of the Augmented Estate
The augmented estate serves two basic functions. First, by
combining the couple's assets, it plays a crucial role in implementing
the marital-partnership theory. Second, it helps prevent fraud on the
spouse's share. The problem of fraud arises when the decedent
attempts to evade the spouse's elective share by making nominally
inter-vivos transfers such as revocable inter-vivos trusts. To render
that type of behavior ineffective, the 1990 UPC includes the value of
the decedent's "reclaimable estate" as a component of the augmented
estate.162 The reclaimable-estate component extends the elective-
share computation to the value of property that was the subject of
specified types of inter-vivos transfers. In general, the decedent's
reclaimable estate includes arrangements that are quite similar to the
will substitutes included in a decedent's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes.
The reclaimable-estate component has historical origins in
legislation in New York' 63 and Pennsylvania.1" These statutes
served as the model for the augmented-estate concept adopted in the
pre-1990 UPC.16 Without legislative guidance, the problem of
preventing evasion of the elective share is thrown to the court system
to decide on a case-by-case basis. 66
162 Id. § 2-202(b)(2), 8 U.L.A. 90.
163 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(b) (McKinney 1981).
164 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301.11(a) (1947) (repealed 1978).
165 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 75 (1983) (amended 1990).
166 An analogous problem arises under the federal estate tax. An elective share
that applies only to the decedent's probate assets is like a federal estate tax that
includes in the gross estate only property owned at death. In the early estate tax
statutes, Congress remedied this problem by including in the gross estate various
inter-vivos transfers such as transfers with a retained power to revoke, transfers with
a retained life estate, joint tenancies, and life insurance. State elective-share systems
must do the same by implementing the 1990 UPC's augmented-estate concept or
something akin to it. Otherwise, the judiciary is forced to erect stop gap measures
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The 1990 UPC strengthens the reclaimable-estate component by
closing loopholes in the pre-1990 UPC. One of these is life insurance
that the decedent purchased, naming someone other than the
decedent's surviving spouse as beneficiary. 167 With appropriate
protection for insurance companies that pay out before receiving
notice of an elective-share claim, the 1990 UPC provision includes
the face value of these insurance policies in the decedent's reclaim-
able estate.168
The 1990 UPC reclaimable estate also includes the value of
property that is subject to a presently exercisable general power of
appointment held solely by the decedent.1 69 Such powers are
viewed as substantively indistinguishable from outright ownership.
The power need not have been created by the decedent and need
not have been conferred on the decedent during the marriage. The
decedent need only have held the power immediately preceding
death or have exercised or released the power in favor of someone
other than the decedent, the decedent's estate, or the decedent's
spouse while married to the spouse and during the two-year period
immediately preceding the decedent's death.
D. Section 2-301: Spouse's Protection Against Premarital Wills
The 1990 UPC also protects a disinherited surviving spouse by
means other than the elective-share system. Section 2-301 of the
1990 UPC, the omitted-spouse provision, protects a surviving spouse
on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984);
Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937).
167 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(b)(2)(iii), 8 U.L.A. 90 (Supp. 1992).
16 Md
169 
"Presently exercisable general power of appointment" is a defined term. Id.
§ 2-202(a)(1)(iii). The definition includes a reserved power of revocation in a
revocable trust. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 11.1 cmL C & illus. 5 (1986).
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against unintentional disinheritance.
Nearly every state has a similar statute for children called a
°pretermitted-heir" statute. These statutes typically protect children
born after the execution of the will against unintentional disinheri-
tance. Although pretermitted-heir statutes are commonplace, and
one is included in the 1990 UPC,170 statutes protecting the dece-
dent's surviving spouse against a premarital will are rare in non-UPC
states.171
The 1990 UPC omitted-spouse provision stands in addition to
the apparatus of the elective-share system. One purpose of the
provision is to reduce the frequency of elections under the elective
share, and thus to reduce the number of times the augmented-estate
procedure is invoked. Another purpose is to provide a share for the
surviving spouse more related to the amount the decedent would
probably have given the surviving spouse had the decedent gotten
around to revising the premarital will.
.Under the omitted-spouse provision of the pre-1990 UPC, a
surviving spouse who was disinherited by a premarital will was given
a right to an intestate share.172 The provision was meant to be
intent-effecting, not intent-defeating. Thus, unlike the elective-share
provisions, the omitted-spouse provision yields to a contrary intention
stated by the decedent in the premarital will or inferred from
circumstances, such as if the will were made in contemplation of the
marriage.
When this provision was first drafted and brought into the pre-
1990 UPC, the setting in which it probably was principally thought to
170 UmF PROBATE CODE § 2-302, 8 ULA. 102 (Supp. 1992).
171 Early common-law doctrines, sometimes codified, addressed the problem by
revoking a person's will if he or she later married. As elective-share statutes came
to replace dower and curtesy, the elective share was thought to provide sufficient
protection against a premarital will.
172 UF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a), 8 U.LA. 88 (1983) (amended 1990).
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operate was with respect to a first marriage. With the remarriage
phenomenon on the increase, whether the remarriage follows divorce
or death of the first spouse, and with the revisions having dramatical-
ly increased the intestate share of the surviving spouse, the UPC
drafters paid additional attention to the omitted-spouse provision.
A particular concern was the impact of this provision on the last
example we discussed in the elective share. That example began with
Ben and Elaine having enjoyed a long marriage that produced
children. Then, after Ben's death, Elaine married Carl. It would not
be exceptional if, during their marriage, Ben and Elaine had executed
mutual wills, in which each devised the entire estate to the other if
the other survives, but if not, to their children. Were this to have
been the situation when Ben died, Elaine would have succeeded to
Ben's entire estate without having to exercise an elective share. It
would also not be exceptional if, after Ben's death, Elaine never
undertook to execute another will, not even after marrying Carl.
This is the type of late-in-life marriage in which Elaine's instincts
would likely be to want to continue to provide for her children from
her first marriage. On her own, without the advice of competent
legal counsel, Elaine could hardly be expected to appreciate the need
for a new will that would merely repeat the provisions in her old will
for her children. For this type of late-in-life marriage, the 1990 UPC
elective-share system grants Carl no claim or a very modest claim
against Elaine's estate. If, however, Carl could use the omitted-
spouse provision to take a much larger portion, he could circumvent
the whole purpose of the elective-share system. Unless Elaine and
Carl entered into a premarital or postmarital agreement or waiver,
the pre-1990 UPC omitted-spouse provision would allow Carl to
accomplish this result.
The 1990 UPC corrects this problem by granting the omitted
spouse an intestate share in only that portion of the decedent's estate
that is neither devised to the decedent's children by a prior marriage
nor to the children's descendants.173  In our hypothetical, the
173 Section 2-301 uses the terms "a child of the testator who was born before the
testator married the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse"
and "a descendant of such a child." Id. § 2-301(a), 8 U.LA. 100 (Supp. 1992).
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omitted-spouse provision would grant Carl nothing and would
relegate him to the elective-share system.
The omitted-spouse provision still plays a useful role, however.
In the case of a first marriage, where occasionally the decedent
spouse may have executed a premarital will in favor of his or her
parents or siblings, the omitted-spouse provision confers the full
intestate share upon the omitted spouse. And, the provision is
certainly not restricted to first marriages, but applies to any marriage.
To the extent that the premarital will favors persons other than
children (or descendants) of a prior marriage, the surviving spouse is
entitled to a full intestate share. This share might very well be the
entire estate and could-in consequence-quite properly give the
spouse more than the elective-share system would otherwise provide.
III. CONCLUSION
The current trend toward multiple marriages is apparently
unremitting. Probate laws must respond intelligently to these
changes and others that are sure to follow. The current probate
laws, including the pre-1990 UPC, are ill-suited to present times.
The UPC drafters believe that the statutory provisions discussed in
this article move in the right direction.
To be sure, as with any uniform laws project, the final package
reflects a multitude of policy choices upon which reasonable minds
can differ. Arguments for making a different choice here or a
different choice there can be made. The most that any uniform laws
project can hope to achieve is well-crafted legislation that reasonably
balances competing interests. No process, not even one as open and
broadly participatory as that of NCCUSL, can produce legislation
upon which all persons agree in all particulars.
The 1990 UPC is therefore not presented as the "right" answer.
No one claims that all other possible answers are "wrong." Rather,
the 1990 UPC is presented as a reasonable package, one that is well
thought out and whose individual parts add up to a coherent whole.
As such, the UPC drafters and their sponsoring organization,
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NCCUSL, believe that the 1990 UPC provides suitable responses to
the multiple-marriage society and is destined to be the model for
American law deep into the next century.
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IV. APPENDIX
STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE
1990 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
PERTAINING TO THE
MULTIPLE-MARRIAGE SOCIETY
Spouse's Share in Intestate Succession
Section 2-102. Share of Spouse. The intestate share of a
decedent's surviving spouse is:
(1) the entire intestate estate if:
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the
decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also
descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant
of the surviving spouse who survives the decedent;
(2) the first [$200,000], plus three-fourths of any balance of
the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the
decedent, but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent;
(3) the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any balance of the
intestate estate, if all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also
descendants of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one
or more surviving descendants who are not descendants of the
decedent;
(4) the first [$100,000], plus one-half of any balance of the
intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent's surviving descen-
dants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.
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Redesigned Elective Share
Section 2-201. Elective Share.
(a) [Elective-Share Amount.] The surviving spouse of a
decedent who dies domiciled in this State has a right of election,
under the limitations and conditions stated in this Part, to take an
elective-share amount equal to the value of the elective-share
percentage of the augmented estate, determined by the length of
time the spouse and the decedent were married to each other, in
accordance with the following schedule:
If the decedent and the
spouse were married to
each other:
Less than 1 year ...................
1 year but less than 2 years
2 years but less than 3 years
3 years but less than 4 years
4 years but less than 5 years
5 years but less than 6 years
6 years but less than 7 years
7 years but less than 8 years
8 years but less than 9 years
9 years but less than 10 years
10 years but less than 11 years
11 years but less than 12 years
12 years but less than 13 years
13 years but less than 14 years
14 years but less than 15 years
15 years or more ................
The elective-share
percentage is:
Supplemental Amount Only.
3% of the augmented estate.
6% of the augmented estate.
9% of the augmented estate.
12% of the augmented estate.
15% of the augmented estate.
18% of the augmented estate.
21% of the augmented estate.
24% of the augmented estate.
27% of the augmented estate.
30% of the augmented estate.
34% of the augmented estate.
38% of the augmented estate.
42% of the augmented estate.
46% of the augmented estate.
50% of the augmented estate.
(b) [Supplemental Elective-Share Amount.] If the sum of the
amounts described in Sections 2-202(b)(3) and (4), 2-207(a)(1) and
(3), and that part of the elective-share amount payable from the
decedent's probate and reclaimable estates under Sections 2-207(b)
and (c) is less than [$50,000], the surviving spouse is entitled to a
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supplemental elective-share amount equal to [$50,000], minus the
sum of the amounts described in those sections. The supplemental
elective-share amount is payable from the decedent's probate estate
and from recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate in the order
of priority set forth in Sections 2-207(b) and (c).
(c) [Non-Domiciliary.] The right, if any, of the surviving
spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled outside this State to take an
elective share in property in this State is governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile at death.
Section 2-202. Augmented Estate.
(a) [Definitions.]
(1) In this section:
(i) "Bona fide purchaser" means a purchaser for
value in good faith and without notice of an adverse claim. The
notation of a state documentary fee on a recorded instrument
pursuant to [insert appropriate reference] is prima facie evidence
that the transfer described therein was made to a bona fide purchas-
er.
(ii) "Nonadverse party" means a person who does
not have a substantial beneficial interest in the trust or other
property arrangement that would be adversely affected by the
exercise or nonexercise of the power that he [or she] possesses
respecting the trust or other property arrangement. A person having
a general power of appointment over property is deemed to have a
beneficial interest in the property.
(iii) "Presently exercisable general power of appoint-
ment" means a power of appointment under which, at the time in
question, the decedent by an exercise of the power could have
created an interest, present or future, in himself [or herself] or his [or
her] creditors.
WINTER 1992
756 26 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
(iv) "Probate estate" means property, whether real or
personal, movable or immovable, wherever situated, that would pass
by intestate succession if the decedent died without a valid will.
(v) "Right to income" includes a right to payments
under an annuity or similar contractual arrangement.
(vi) "Value of property owned by the surviving
spouse at the decedent's death" and "value of property to which the
surviving spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's death" include
the commuted value of any present or future interest then held by
the surviving spouse and the commuted value of amounts payable to
the surviving spouse after the decedent's death under any trust, life
insurance settlement option, annuity contract, public or private
pension, disability compensation, death benefit or retirement plan, or
any similar arrangement, exclusive of the federal Social Security
system.
(2) In subsections (b)(2)(iii) and (iv), "transfer" includes
an exercise or release of a power of appointment, but does not
include a lapse of a power of appointment.
(b) [Property Included in Augmented Estate.] The augment-
ed estate consists of the sum of:
(1) the value of the decedent's probate estate, reduced by
funeral and administration expenses, homestead allowance, family
allowances and exemptions, and enforceable claims; 174
(2) the value of the decedent's reclaimable estate. The
decedent's reclaimable estate is composed of all property, whether
174 As defined in § 1-201, the term "claims" includes "liabilities of the decedent
or protected person whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities
of the estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appoint-
ment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and expenses of administration.
The term does not include estate or inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes
regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific assets alleged to be
included in the estate." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(6), 8 U.L.A. 8 (Supp. 1992).
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real or personal, movable or immovable, wherever situated, not
included in the decedent's probate estate, of any of the following
types:
(i) property to the extent the passing of the
principal thereof to or for the benefit of any person, other than the
decedent's surviving spouse, was subject to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment held by the decedent alone, if the
decedent held that power immediately before his [or her] death or if
and to the extent the decedent, while married to his [or her] surviving
spouse and during the two-year period next preceding the decedent's
death, released that power or exercised that power in favor of any
person other than the decedent or the decedent's estate, spouse, or
surviving spouse;
(ii) property, to the extent of the decedent's
unilaterally severable interest therein, held by the decedent and any
other person, except the decedent's surviving spouse, with right of
survivorship, if the decedent held that interest immediately before his
[or her] death or if and to the extent the decedent, while married to
his [or her] surviving spouse and during the two-year period
preceding the decedent's death, transferred that interest to any
person other than the decedent's surviving spouse;
(iii) proceeds of insurance, including accidental death
benefits, on the life of the decedent payable to any person other than
the decedent's surviving spouse, if the decedent owned the insurance
policy, had the power to change the beneficiary of the insurance
policy, or the insurance policy was subject to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment held by the decedent alone immedi-
ately before his [or her] death or if and to the extent the decedent,
while married to his [or her] surviving spouse and during the two-
year period next preceding the decedent's death, transferred that
policy to any person other than the decedent's surviving spouse; and
(iv) property transferred by the decedent to any
person other than a bona fide purchaser at any time during the
decedent's marriage to the surviving spouse, to or for the benefit of
any person, other than the decedent's surviving spouse, if the transfer
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is of any of the following types:
(A) any transfer to the extent that the decedent
retained at the time of or during the two-year period next preceding
his [or her] death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income
from, the property;
(B) any transfer to the extent that, at the time
of or during the two-year period next preceding the decedent's death,
the income or principal was subject to a power, exercisable by the
decedent alone or in conjunction with any other person or exercis-
able by a nonadverse party, for the benefit of the decedent or the
decedent's estate;
(C) any transfer of property, to the extent the
decedent's contribution to it, as a percentage of the whole, was made
within two years before the decedent's death, by which the property
is held, at the time of or during the two-year period next preceding
the decedent's death, by the decedent and another, other than the
decedent's surviving spouse, with right of survivorship; or
(D) any transfer made to a donee within two
years before the decedent's death to the extent that the aggregate
transfers to any one donee in either of the years exceed $10,000.00;
(3) the value of property to which the surviving spouse
succeeds by reason of the decedent's death, other than by homestead
allowance, exempt property, family allowance, testate succession, or
intestate succession, including the proceeds of insurance, including
accidental death benefits, on the life of the decedent and benefits
payable under a retirement plan in which the decedent was a
participant, exclusive of the federal Social Security system; and
(4) the value of property owned by the surviving spouse
at the decedent's death, reduced by enforceable claims against that
property or that spouse, plus the value of amounts that would have
been includible in the surviving spouse's reclaimable estate had the
spouse predeceased the decedent. But amounts that would have
been includible in the surviving spouse's reclaimable estate under
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subsection (b)(2)(iii) are not valued as if he [or she] were deceased.
(c) [Exclusions.] Any transfer or exercise or release of a
power of appointment is excluded from the decedent's reclaimable
estate (i) to the extent the decedent received adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth for the transfer, exercise, or
release or (ii) if irrevocably made with the written consent or joinder
of the surviving spouse.
(d) [Valuation.] Property is valued as of the decedent's death,
but property irrevocably transferred during the two-year period next
preceding the decedent's death which is included in the decedent's
reclaimable estate under subsection (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iv) is valued
as of the time of the transfer. If the terms of more than one of the
subparagraphs or sub-subparagraphs of subsection (b)(2) apply, the
property is included in the augmented estate under the subparagraph
or sub-subparagraph that yields the highest value. For the purposes
of this subsection, an "irrevocable transfer of property" includes an
irrevocable exercise or release of a power of appointment.
(e) [Protection of Payors and Other Third Parties.]
(1) Although under this section a payment, item of
property, or other benefit is included in the decedent's reclaimable
estate, a payor 17 or other third party is not liable for having made
a payment or transferred an item of property or other benefit to a
beneficiary designated in a governing instrument, 176 or for having
175 The term "payor" is defined to mean "a trustee, insurer, business entity,
employer, government, governmental agency or subdivision, or any other person
authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument to make payments." UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 1-201(34), 8 U.L.A. 10 (Supp. 1992).
176 The term "beneficiary designated in a governing instrument" is defined to
include a "grantee of a deed, a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a beneficiary of a
beneficiary designation, a donee, appointee, or taker in default of a power of
appointment, or a person in whose favor a power of attorney or a power held in any
individual, fiduciary, or representative capacity is exercised." Ild. § 1-201(3), 8 U.L.A.
8. A "governing instrument" means a "deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy,
account with POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD),
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taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of a
governing instrument, upon request and satisfactory proof of the
decedent's death, before the payor or other third party received
written notice from the surviving spouse or spouse's representative of
an intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition
for the elective share has been filed. A payor or other third party is
liable for payments made or other actions taken after the payor or
other third party received written notice of an intention to file a
petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective share
has been filed.
(2) The written notice of intention to file a petition for
the elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been
filed must be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office
or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or
served upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as a
summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of
intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for
the elective share has been filed, a payor or other third party may
pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of property
held by it to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate
proceedings relating to the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings
have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of
probate proceedings relating to decedents' estates located in the
county of the decedent's residence. The court shall hold the funds or
item of property and, upon its determination under Section 2-205(d),
shall order disbursement in accordance with the determination. If no
petition is filed in the court within the specified time under Section
2-205(a) or, if filed, the demand for an elective share is withdrawn
under Section 2-205(c), the court shall order disbursement to the
designated beneficiary. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or
with the court discharge the payor or other third party from all
claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property
transferred to or deposited with the court.
pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or
exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive,
appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type." Id. § 1-201(19), 8 U.L.A.
9.
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(3) Upon petition to the probate court by the beneficiary
designated in a governing instrument, the court may order that all or
part of the property be paid to the beneficiary in an amount and
subject to conditions consistent with this section.
(f) [Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers; Personal Liability of
Recipient.]
(1) A person who purchases property from a recipient for
value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item of
property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable
obligation, is neither obligated under this Part to return the payment,
item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this Part for the
amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or
benefit. But a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of
property, or any other benefit included in the decedent's reclaimable
estate is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or
benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the
value of the item of property or benefit, as provided in Section 2-207.
(2) If any section or part of any section of this Part is
preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of
property, or any other benefit included in the decedent's reclaimable
estate, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of
property, or any other benefit is obligated to return that payment,
item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of
that payment or the value of that item of property or benefit, as
provided in Section 2-207, to the person who would have been
entitled to it were that section or part of that section not preempted.
Section 2-203. Right of Election Personal to Surviving Spouse.
(a) [Surviving Spouse Must Be Living at Time of Election.]
The right of election may be exercised only by a surviving spouse who
is living when the petition for the elective share is filed in the court
under Section 2-205(a). If the election is not exercised by the
surviving spouse personally, it may be exercised on the surviving
spouse's behalf by his [or her] conservator, guardian, or agent under
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the authority of a power of attorney.
(b) [Incapacitated Surviving Spouse.] If the election is
exercised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated
person,177 that portion of the elective-share and supplemental
elective-share amounts due from the decedent's probate estate and
recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate under Sections 2-
207(b) and (c) must be placed in a custodial trust for the benefit of
the surviving spouse under the provisions of the [Enacting state]
Uniform Custodial Trust Act, except as modified below. For the
purposes of this subsection, an election on behalf of a surviving
spouse by an agent under a durable power of attorney is presumed
to be on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person.
For purposes of the custodial trust established by this subsection, (i)
the electing guardian, conservator, or agent is the custodial trustee,
(ii) the surviving spouse is the beneficiary, (iii) the custodial trust is
deemed to have been created by the decedent spouse by written
transfer that takes effect at the decedent spouse's death and that
directs the custodial trustee to administer the custodial trust as for an
incapacitated beneficiary.
(c) [Custodial Trust.] For the purposes of subsection (b), the
[Enacting state] Uniform Custodial Trust Act must be applied as if
Section 6(b) thereof were repealed and Sections 2(e), 9(b), and 17(a)
were amended to read as follows:
(1) Neither an incapacitated beneficiary nor anyone
acting on behalf of an incapacitated beneficiary has a power to
terminate the custodial trust; but if the beneficiary regains capacity,
the beneficiary then acquires the power to terminate the custodial
trust by delivering to the custodial trustee a writing signed by the
beneficiary declaring the termination. If not previously terminated,
the custodial trust terminates on the death of the beneficiary.
177 The term "incapacitated person" is defined to mean "any person who is
impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability,
chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except minority) to the
extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-103(7), 8 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1992).
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(2) If the beneficiary is incapacitated, the custodial
trustee shall expend so much or all of the custodial trust property as
the custodial trustee considers advisable for the use and benefit of
the beneficiary and individuals who were supported by the beneficia-
ry when the beneficiary became incapacitated, or who are legally
entitled to support by the beneficiary. Expenditures may be made in
the manner, when, and to the extent that the custodial trustee
determines suitable and proper, without court order but with regard
to other support, income, and property of the beneficiary [exclusive
of] [and] benefits of medical or other forms of assistance from any
state or federal government or governmental agency for which the
beneficiary must qualify on the basis of need.
(3) Upon the beneficiary's death, the remaining custodial
trust property, in the following order: (i) under the residuary clause,
if any, of the will of the beneficiary's predeceased spouse against
whom the elective share was taken, as if that predeceased spouse
died immediately after the beneficiary; or (ii) to that predeceased
spouse's heirs under Section 2-711 of [this State's] Uniform Probate
Code.
[STATES THAT HAVE NOT ADOPTED THE
UNIFORM CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT SHOULD ADOPT
THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE SUBSECTION (B)
AND NOT ADOPT SUBSECTION (B) OR (C) ABOVE]
[(b) [Incapacitated Surviving Spouse.] If the election is
exercised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated
person, the court must set aside that portion of the elective-share and
supplemental elective-share amounts due from the decedent's
probate estate and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate
under Section 2-207(b) and (c) and must appoint a trustee to
administer that property for the support of the surviving spouse. For
the purposes of this subsection, an election on behalf of a surviving
spouse by an agent under a durable power of attorney is presumed
to be on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person.
The trustee must administer the trust in accordance with the
following terms and such additional terms as the court determines
appropriate:
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(1) Expenditures of income and principal may be made
in the manner, when, and to the extent that the trustee determines
suitable and proper for the surviving spouse's support, without court
order but with regard to other support, income, and property of the
surviving spouse [exclusive oq [and] benefits of medical or other
forms of assistance from any state or federal government or
governmental agency for which the surviving spouse must qualify on
the basis of need.
(2) During the surviving spouse's incapacity, neither the
surviving spouse nor anyone acting on behalf of the surviving spouse
has a power to terminate the trust; but if the surviving spouse regains
capacity, the surviving spouse then acquires the power to terminate
the trust and acquire full ownership of the trust property free of
trust, by delivering to the trustee a writing signed by the surviving
spouse declaring the termination.
(3) Upon the surviving spouse's death, the trustee shall
transfer the unexpended trust property in the following order:. (i)
under the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the predeceased
spouse against whom the elective share was taken, as if that
predeceased spouse died immediately after the surviving spouse; or
(ii) to that predeceased spouse's heirs under Section 2-711.]
Section 2-204. Waiver of Right to Elect and of Other Rights.
(a) The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights
of the surviving spouse to homestead allowance, exempt property,
and family allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or
partially, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement,
or waiver signed by the surviving spouse.
(b) A surviving spouse's waiver is not enforceable if the
surviving spouse proves that:
(1) he [or she] did not execute the waiver voluntarily,
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(2) the waiver was unconscionable when it was executed
and, before execution of the waiver, he [or she]:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the decedent;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in
writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations
of the decedent beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had,
an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the
decedent.
(c) An issue of unconscionability of a waiver is for decision by
the court as a matter of law.
(d) Unless it provides to the contrary, a waiver of "all rights,"
or equivalent language, in the property or estate of a present or
prospective spouse or a complete property settlement entered into
after or in anticipation of separation or divorce is a waiver of all
rights of elective share, homestead allowance, exempt property, and
family allowance by each spouse in the property of the other and a
renunciation by each of all benefits that would otherwise pass to him
[or her] from the other by the intestate succession or by virtue of any
will executed before the waiver or property settlement.
Section 2-205. Proceeding for Elective Share; Time Limit.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the election must be
made by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the personal
representative, if any, a petition for the elective share within nine
months after the date of the decedent's death, or within six months
after the probate of the decedent's will, whichever limitation later
expires. The surviving spouse must give notice of the time and place
set for hearing to persons interested in the estate and to the
distributee and recipients of portions of the augmented estate whose
interests will be adversely affected by the taking of the elective share.
WINTER 1992
766 26 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
Except as provided in subsection (b), the decedent's reclaimable
estate, described in Section 2-202(b)(2), is not included within the
augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective share, if
the petition is filed more than nine months after the decedent's
death.
(b) Within nine months after the decedent's death, the
surviving spouse may petition the court for an extension of time for
making an election. If, within nine months after the decedent's
death, the spouse gives notice of the petition to all persons interested
in the decedent's reclaimable estate, the court for cause shown by the
surviving spouse may extend the time for election. If the court grants
the spouse's petition for an extension, the decedent's reclaimable
estate, described in Section 2-202(b)(2), is not excluded from the
augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective-share
and supplemental elective-share amounts, if the spouse makes an
election by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the
personal representative, if any, a petition for the elective share within
the time allowed by the extension.
(c) The surviving spouse may withdraw his [or her] demand
for an elective share at any time before entry of a final determination
by the court.
(d) After notice and hearing, the court shall determine the
elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts, and shall
order its payment from the assets of the augmented estate or by
contribution as appears appropriate under Section 2-207. If it
appears that a fund or property included in the augmented estate has
not come into the possession of the personal representative, or has
been distributed by the personal representative, the court neverthe-
less shall fix the liability of any person who has any interest in the
fund or property or who has possession thereof, whether as trustee or
otherwise. The proceeding may be maintained against fewer than all
persons against whom relief could be sought, but no person is subject
to contribution in any greater amount than he [or she] would have
been under Section 2-207 had relief been secured against all persons
subject to contribution.
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(e) An order or judgment of the court may be enforced as
necessary in suit for contribution or payment in other courts of this
State or other jurisdictions.
Section 2-206. Effect of Election on Benefits by Will or Statute.
If the right of election is exercised by or on behalf of the
surviving spouse, the surviving spouse's homestead allowance, exempt
property, and family allowance, if any, are not charged against but
are in addition to the elective-share and supplemental elective-share
amounts.
Section 2-207. Charging Spouse With Owned Assets and Gifts
Received; Liability of Others for Balance of Elective Share.
(a) [Elective-Share Amount Only.] In a proceeding for an
elective share, the following are applied first to satisfy the elective-
share amount and to reduce or eliminate any contributions due from
the decedent's probate estate and recipients of the decedent's
reclaimable estate:
(1) amounts included in the augmented estate which pass
or have passed to the surviving spouse by testate or intestate
succession;
(2) amounts included in the augmented estate under
Section 2-202(b)(3);
(3) amounts included in the augmented estate which
would have passed to the spouse but were disclaimed; and
(4) amounts included in the augmented estate under
Section 2-202(b)(4) up to the applicable percentage thereof. For the
purposes of this subsection, the "applicable percentage" is twice the
elective-share percentage set forth in the schedule in Section 2-201 (a)
appropriate to the length of time the spouse and the decedent were
married to each other.
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(b) [Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share Amount; Supple-
mental Elective-Share Amount.] If, after the application of subsec-
tion (a), the elective-share amount is not fully satisfied or the
surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount,
amounts included in the decedent's probate estate and that portion
of the decedent's reclaimable estate other than amounts irrevocably
transferred within two years before the decedent's death are applied
first to satisfy the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or
the supplemental elective-share amount. The decedent's probate
estate and that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate are so
applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share
amount or for the supplemental elective-share amount is equitably
apportioned among the recipients of the decedent's probate estate
and that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate in proportion to
the value of their interests therein.
(c) [Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share and Supplemental
Elective-Share Amounts.] If, after the application of subsections (a)
and (b), the elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount is
not fully satisfied, the remaining portion of the decedent's reclaim-
able estate is so applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of
the elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount is equitably
apportioned among the recipients of that portion of the decedent's
reclaimable estate in proportion to the value of their interests
therein.
(d) [Liability of Recipients of Reclaimable Estate and Their
Donees.] Only original recipients of the reclaimable estate described
in Section 2-202(b)(2), and the donees of the recipients of the
reclaimable estate to the extent the donees have the property or its
proceeds, are liable to make a proportional contribution toward
satisfaction of the surviving spouse's elective-share or supplemental
elective-share amount A person liable to make contribution may
choose to give up the proportional part of the reclaimable estate or
to pay the value of the amount for which he [or she] is liable.
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Spouse's Protection in the Case of a Premarital Wdl
Section 2-301. Entitlement of Spouse; Premarital Will.
(a) If a testator's surviving spouse married the testator after
the testator executed his [or her] will, the surviving spouse is entitled
to receive, as an intestate share, no less than the value of the share
of the estate he [or she] would have received if the testator had died
intestate as to that portion of the testator's estate, if any, that neither
is devised to a child of the testator who was born before the testator
married the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving
spouse nor is devised or passes under Sections 2-603 or 2-604178 to
a descendant of such a child, unless:
(1) it appears from the will or other evidence that the
will was made in contemplation of the testator's marriage to the
surviving spouse;
(2) the will expresses the intention that it is to be
effective notwithstanding any subsequent marriage; or
(3) the testator provided for the spouse by transfer
outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a
testamentary provision is shown by the testator's statements or is
reasonably inferred from the amount of the transfer or other
evidence.
(b) In satisfying the share provided by this section, devises
made by the will to the testator's surviving spouse, if any, are applied
first, and other devises, other than a devise to a child of the testator
who was born before the testator married the surviving spouse and
who is not a child of the surviving spouse or a devise or substitute
gift under Sections 2-603 or 2-604 to a descendant of such a child,
abate as provided in Section 3-902.
178 Sections 2-603 and 2-604 are the UPC's antilapse statutes. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-603 to -604, 8 U.L.A. 125-32 (Supp. 1992).
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Revocation- Upon-Divorce Provision
Section 2-804. Revocation of Probate and Nonprobate Transfers by
Divorce; No Revocation by Other Changes of Circumstances.
(a) [Definitions.] In this section:
(1) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a
transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary
designated in a governing instrument. 79
(2) "Divorce or annulment" means any divorce or
annulment, or any dissolution or declaration of invalidity of a
marriage, that would exclude the spouse as a surviving spouse within
the meaning of Section 2-802. A decree of separation that does not
terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for
purposes of this section.
(3) "Divorced individual" includes an individual whose
marriage has been annulled.
(4) "Governing instrument" means a governing instru-
ment 8° executed by the divorced individual before the divorce or
annulment of his [or her] marriage to his [or her] former spouse.
(5) "Relative of the divorced individual's former spouse"
means an individual who is related to the divorced individual's former
spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity and who, after the divorce or
annulment, is not related to the divorced individual by blood,
adoption, or affinity.
(6) "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appoint-
ment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the divorced
individual, at the time of the divorce or annulment, was alone
179 For the definitions of the terms "beneficiary designated in a governing
instrument" and "governing instrument," see supra note 176.
180 For the definition of the term "governing instrument," see supra note 176.
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empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the
designation in favor of his [or her] former spouse or former spouse's
relative, whether or not the divorced individual was then empowered
to designate himself [or herself] in place of his [or her] former
spouse or in place of his [or her] former spouse's relative and
whether or not the divorced individual then had the capacity to
exercise the power.
(b) [Revocation Upon Divorce.] Except as provided by the
express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract
relating to the division of the marital estate made between the
divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or
annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage:
(1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment
of property made by a divorced individual to his [or her] former
spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment
created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the
divorced individual's former spouse, (ii) provision in a governing
instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment
on the divorced individual's former spouse or on a relative of the
divorced individual's former spouse, and (iii) nomination in a
governing instrument, nominating a divorced individual's former
spouse or a relative of the divorced individual's former spouse to
serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal
representative, executor, trustee, conservator, agent, or guardian; and
(2) severs the interests of the former spouses in property
held by them at the time of the divorce or annulment as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship [or as community property with the
right of survivorship], 181 transforming the interests of the former
spouses into tenancies in common.
181 The terms "joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community
property with the right of survivorship" are defined to include "co-owners of property
held under circumstances that entitle one or more to the whole of the property on
the death of the other or others, but exclude[] forms of co-ownership registration in
which the underlying ownership of each party is in proportion to that party's
contribution." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(26), 8 U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 1992).
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(c) [Effect of Severance.] A severance under subsection
(b)(2) does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired
for value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivor-
ship in the survivor of the former spouses unless a writing declaring
the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in
records appropriate to the kind and location of the property which
are relied upon, in the ordinary course of transactions involving such
property, as evidence of ownership.
(d) [Effect of Revocation.] Provisions of a governing
instrument that are not revoked by this section are given effect as if
the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse disclaimed' 82
the revoked provisions or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a
fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the former spouse and
relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the divorce or
annulment.
(e) [Revival if Divorce Nullified.] Provisions revoked solely
by this section are revived by the divorced individual's remarriage to
the former spouse or by a nullification of the divorce or annulment.
(f) [No Revocation for Other Change of Circumstances.] No
change of circumstances other than as described in this section and
in Section 2-803 effects a revocation.
(g) [Protection of Payors and Other Third Parties.]
(1) A payor'83 or other third party is not liable for
having made a payment or transferred an item of property or any
other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument
affected by a divorce, annulment, or remarriage, or for having taken
182 Under the UPC's disclaimer provision, § 2-801, a disclaimant, generally
speaking, is treated as if he or she predeceased the decedent in the case of a transfer
under a testamentary instrument and predeceased the effective date of the
instrument or contract in the case of a transfer under a nontestamentary instrument
or contract. Id. § 2-801, 8 U.L.A. 156-57.
1g For the definition of the term "payor," see supra note 175.
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any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the
governing instrument, before the payor or other third party received
written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage. A payor or
other third party is liable for a payment made or other action taken
after the payor or other third party received written notice of a
claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section.
(2) Written notice of the divorce, annulment, or
remarriage under subsection (g)(2) must be mailed to the payor's or
other third party's main office or home by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested, or served upon the payor or other
third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon
receipt of written notice of the divorce, annulment, or remarriage, a
payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or
deposit any item of property held by it to or with the court having
jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to the decedent's
estate or, if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the
court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedents'
estates located in the county of the decedent's residence. The court
shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination
under this section, shall order disbursement or transfer in accordance
with the determination. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or
with the court discharge the payor or other third party from all
claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property
transferred to or deposited with the court.
(h) [Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers; Personal Liability of
Recipient.]
(1) A person who purchases property from a former
spouse, relative of a former spouse, or any other person for value
and without notice, or who receives from a former spouse, relative of
a former spouse, or any other person a payment or other item of
property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable
obligation, is neither obligated under this section to return the
payment, item of property, or benefit nor is liable under this section
for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property
or benefit. But a former spouse, relative of a former spouse, or
other person who, not for value, received a payment, item of
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property, or any other benefit to which that person is not entitled
under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of
property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the
payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the
person who is entitled to it under this section.
(2) If this section or any part of this section is preempted
by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any
other benefit covered by this section, a former spouse, relative of the
former spouse, or any other person who, not for value, received a
payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which that person
is not entitled under this section is obligated to return that payment,
item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of
the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the
person who would have been entitled to it were this section or part
of this section not preempted.
